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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
In my rst chapter, I use a novel dataset of customer reviews from Amazon.com
to study the impact of managerial myopia on product market reputation. Using
exogenous variation due to the timing of CEO equity vesting events, I show that
short-term incentive shocks predict declines in reputation. A changing product
market lineup and a deterioration of existing products are two mechanisms through
which reputation is aected. The eect is larger when the CEO has other short-term
concerns and when the rm has a low reputation in the product market. However,
higher advertising expenses mitigate the negative reputational eect among consumers.
Using an alternative empirical methodology, I nd that higher short-term ownership
in the rm is also associated with declining product market reputation, while higher
long-term ownership is associated with increasing reputation. My second chapter
uses a dierent setting to examine the consequences of personal wealth incentives.
We test whether household wealth shocks aect professional misconduct by nancial
advisors. We use a panel of advisors' home addresses and examine within-advisor
variation relative to other advisors who work at the same rm and live in the same
ZIP code. We show that advisors increase misconduct following declines in their
homes' values. The increased misconduct is due, in part, to willful actions, such as
churning. We show that advisors' housing returns explain misconduct targeting out-
of-state customers, breaking the link between customer and advisor housing shocks.
Further, the results are stronger for advisors with lower career risk from committing
misconduct.
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Chapter 1 Managerial Myopia and Product Market Reputation:
Evidence from Amazon.com Reviews
1.1 Introduction
The relevance of intangible assets has been steadily increasing in recent decades.
In 2016, U.S. companies had over $8 trillion of intangible assets, about half of the
combined market capitalization of the S&P 500 at the time.1 While the use of intan-
gible assets has been increasing, much of the current research on rm investment still
focuses on investment in physical assets.
Executives have long understood the value of intangible assets such as intellectual
property, training, client relationships, and reputation. John Stuart, the CEO of
Quaker Oats in the early 20th century, once said If this business were split up, I
would be glad to take the brands, trademarks and goodwill and you could have all
the bricks and mortarand I would fare better than you. Empirical research on
intangible assets, however, has historically been constrained due to the diculty in
valuing many of these assets and the relative lack of data, issues which have become
easier to address with modern data. Using a novel dataset of crowd-sourced customer
reviews from Amazon.com, I explore an important intangible asset, product market
reputation, and show how it is impacted by managerial incentives.
Product market reputation is an amalgam of consumer opinions. It encompasses
factors such as quality, customer service, and corporate social responsibility, and it
plays an important role in the decision making process of consumers. For example,
customers are willing to pay higher prices and are more loyal to the rm when the
rm has a high reputation.2 Technology consumers who have a preference for the
Apple ecosystem are typically aware they pay an Apple premium, but perceived
intangible factors such as reputation are usually cited as the justication for paying
this premium. On the other hand, a low reputation harms the rm. After admitting
to using illegal software to cheat on emissions testing, Volkswagen experienced a
consumer exodus, and sales have still not fully recovered. Ceteris paribus, a positive
reputation is a valuable asset for rms.
Given the growth in the importance of intangible assets, an understanding of their
determinants leads to a better understanding of rm behavior. In much the same
way executives decide to invest in physical capital, they may also decide to invest in
intangible capital such as reputation. However, the characteristics of product market
reputation are notably dierent than physical capital, so it may be the case that
investment in reputation is handled dierently by executives. For instance, reputation
is harder to value and rms cannot resell it in the same way they can resell physical
capital. It is also more dicult for rms to use intangible capital as collateral in
lending arrangements.
1https://www.wsj.com/articles/accountings-21st-century-challenge-how-to-value-intangible-
assets-1458605126
2See, e.g., Larkin (2013) and Melnik and Alm (2002)
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In this paper I study the impact of CEO short-term incentives on product market
reputation. Specically, using multiple measures of short-termism, or myopia, I nd
that the product market reputation of a rm is negatively impacted in the years
following CEO short-term incentive shocks. In my primary tests I use the plausibly
exogenous vesting of stock and options grants to the CEO as shocks to the incentive
structure. These vesting schedules are typically set up years in advance and are
therefore unlikely to be related to contemporaneous product market conditions. Yet
these vesting events create distortions in the incentive structure faced by management
since they are usually accompanied by large amounts of insider selling (Edmans, Fang,
and Lewellen, 2017). Executives even admit to a surprising degree that they are
willing to sacrice positive NPV projects when they have concerns about the near-
term stock price (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). I nd that when stock vests
to the CEO, the product market reputation, as measured by the average number of
stars on Amazon.com, declines by approximately 10% in the subsequent year.
A variety of mechanisms exist through which management can aect reputation
in the product market. They may change product quality directly by adjusting the
inputs used in the manufacturing process (e.g., substituting a metal component for a
plastic one). Relatedly, they might also change the customer experience by increas-
ing or decreasing the amount of support they provide for their products following
purchases (e.g., outsourcing a call center). In additional tests, I incorporate product
xed eects to show that the myopic incentive shocks cause within-product declines
in reputation, consistent with a cost cutting mechanism.
Another potential mechanism through which reputation might be aected relates
to the product market composition. Firms choose when to release new products and
when to retire old products, and the release of a new product to the market is a
potentially risky event. If the product is well-received it obviously bodes well for the
company, but a poorly received product can result in lower sales and lower reputation.
A CEO that faces short-term stock price incentives could become more risk averse
and delay the release of new products, reducing the rate of product releases in the
event year. Indeed I nd that in years in which the CEO has a vesting event the
rm is more likely to reduce the rate at which they introduce new products, causing
a reduction in the number of total products oered by the rm.
While rm reputation in the product market has been explored theoretically for
decades, only recently has the data allowed empirical investigation. Fortunately, the
rise in online shopping, and more specically the availability of crowd-sourced cus-
tomer reviews, now makes empirical measurement of widespread customer perceptions
more feasible. I create the measure of product market reputation using a large sample
of user-submitted product reviews on Amazon.com, a large online retailer. In addi-
tion to information on product identiers, the review submission date, the customer
rating of the product (out of ve stars), and the text of the review, I also collect
the brand and rm information from each product's Amazon page. This allows me
to match products to companies. This process yields information on approximately
400,000 products,3 for which approximately 4.3 million reviews were written.
3A product is dened as a unique Amazon Standard Identication Number (ASIN).
2
The Amazon.com data is particularly well-suited for this setting since products
remain on the site even after they are discontinued, thus avoiding survivorship bias.
I am also able to observe reviews that were designated as Helpful by the other cus-
tomers. I limit my analysis to these Helpful reviews in robustness tests, and my
results hold: a short-term incentive shock causes product market reputation to de-
cline among the most helpful consumers.
As an alternative methodology, I use the rm's ownership composition as a proxy
for the degree of short-termism. Previous work has shown that rms with Transient
(i.e., short-term) owners are on average more preoccupied with near-term results,
while rms with Dedicated (long-term) owners are not (Bushee, 2001). These supple-
mentary results are consistent with the primary ndings: rms with CEOs who have
immediate concerns about the stock price experience a decline in product market
reputation.
I then investigate whether there is a dierential eect across existing incentive
structures. CEOs that are closer to retirement may have less of an incentive to care
about long-run rm value, which in turn could mean that they are more likely to be
aected by these incentive shocks. A similar eect may exist for highly levered rms.
Matsa (2011) shows that CEOs of highly levered supermarket rms, with near-term
cash ow concerns for debt service, reduce quality to conserve cash. Consistent with
these hypotheses, I nd that the negative reputational shock in the product market
is largest for rms with CEOs nearing retirement and rms with relatively higher
leverage.
The reputational eect may also vary across other reputational factors. If invest-
ment in reputation faces diminishing marginal returns, then the shock to short-term
incentives should have more severe consequences for rms who already have a low
reputation. This eect would be consistent with the ndings of Larkin (2013) if rep-
utation begets loyalty. She shows that higher brand loyalty is associated with a more
inelastic demand curve on the part of the consumers, which in turn allows the rm
to support more leverage and maintain less cash since the cost of nancial distress is
lower due to lower cash ow volatility. However, if reputation, unlike physical capital,
is a fragile asset, then short-term decisions could result in more severe reputational
consequences for rms with high reputation.
My results are consistent with the rst hypothesis. Firms with low reputation are
more likely to experience further reductions in product market reputation following
vesting events. This hypothesis is also supported by subsequent results that show the
eect is mitigated when rms spend more on advertising. Higher advertising expenses
could support the inelastic demand discussed by Larkin (2013) and safeguard the rm
against these reputational consequences. The results also lend support to the notion
of diminishing marginal returns to investment in intangible capital.
I contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, I build and use a
novel dataset that allows me to measure product market reputation, an important
intangible asset. Prior work has examined consequences of reputation. Using a sample
of corporate donations, Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010) nd that when
rms are seen as philanthropic it positively predicts sales growth, particularly for
rms whose primary customers are individuals and not other rms. Their results
3
are consistent with the ndings of Melnik and Alm (2002) who show that vendors
with a higher reputation are able to sell an identical product for a higher price.
Gerken, Starks, and Yates (2018) show that mutual fund customers are more likely
to purchase a fund from the same family when they have had a positive experience
with the family in the past, consistent with the benets to positive reputation.4 While
this strand of research focuses on the consequences of reputation, I instead contribute
to the literature by helping to explain how reputation is aected and how it can be
managed.
I also contribute to the literature on executive compensation. It is important
to understand how compensation contracts interact with reputation in the product
market if we are to have a better understanding of the compensation arrangements.
When the incentives of the manager are not aligned with the shareholders, the man-
ager may make decisions for short-term personal gain at the expense of long-term
shareholder value (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Narayanan, 1985). While research
has documented the impact of myopia on physical investment (Edmans, Fang, and
Lewellen, 2017; Moore, 2018), mergers and acquisitions (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos,
2005), and earnings forecasts (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005), I am the rst
to my knowledge to document how CEO incentive structures relate to reputation
among consumers.
Reviews from customers oer unique and informative data about the rm that
the market cannot nd in nancial statements, news articles, or management guid-
ance. Though each individual review may not convey anything material, in aggregate,
research has demonstrated the value of these crowdsourced measures. Giles (2005)
examines the error rate in Wikipedia entries, a crowd-sourced knowledge base, and
compares it to the error rate in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Despite the potential
for contribution by uneducated sources, he nds the Wikipedia error rate to be almost
identical to the error rate of Encyclopedia Britannica. A similar relation has been
shown with earnings forecasts. Jame, Johnston, Markov, and Wolfe (2016) nd that
crowdsourced earnings estimates provide incremental value and can be used in tan-
dem with other more traditional information to better forecast a company's earnings.
This provides additional support to the hypothesis that customer reviews provide a
unique and important insight into the operation of the company.
In one of the rst papers to use Amazon.com reviews, McAuley and Leskovec
(2013) use the reviews data to improve recommender system algorithms. Huang
(2018) instead connects the data to stock returns and nds that abnormal changes to
reviews predict stock returns, earnings surprises, and revenue surprises. While Huang
(2018) highlights another outcome of this measure, I contribute by studying factors
that aect reputation among consumers.
I also contribute to the growing discussion in the literature on product markets.
Sheen (2014) uses data on product quality from Consumer Reports to show that,
following a merger, the quality of products between the two companies converges
4Related work examines other types of intangible assets. For example, Cliord and Gerken (2018)
nd that the advisor-client relationship in the market for nancial advice is an important intangible
asset that signicantly impacts advisor behavior when ownership of the asset is transmitted from
employer to employee.
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and the price falls relative to competitors. Cavallo (2018) examines the growth of the
online product market and its macroeconomic implications. I instead study rm-level
changes to better understand the microeconomic implications.
Lastly, I contribute to the literature that explores the consequences of varying
ownership structures. Bushee (1998) nds that rms with high Dedicated institutional
ownership (owners with a long time horizon and low portfolio diversity) are more
focused on the long-term and are less likely to cut R&D in order to reverse an earnings
decline. The opposite is true for Transient ownership (owners with a short time
horizon and high portfolio diversity). Similarly, long-term institutional ownership
has been shown to predict rm protability and stock market performance (Cella,
2009; Cliord, 2008). Consistent with this literature, I nd the investment horizon
of institutional owners predicts future changes in product market reputation.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Amazon Data
My measure of product market reputation comes from customer reviews posted on
Amazon.com, one of the largest retailers in the world.5 Individual shoppers who use
the Amazon site are able to leave feedback about their experiences with products.
This feedback usually consists of a small amount of text and a rating, or number
of stars out of ve they assign the product. Specically, each observation in my
data contains the Amazon Standard Identication Number (ASIN) which uniquely
identies the product, a user identier, the text of the written review, the number of
stars (out of ve) that the user assigned to the product, the date and time the review
was published, and Helpful votes. When a person publishes a review on the platform
other users are then able to upvote the review or downvote the review.6
I use reviews from 20 of the Amazon product categories: Arts, Automotive, Baby,
Beauty, Cell Phones and Accessories, Clothing and Accessories, Electronics, Gourmet
Foods, Health, Home and Kitchen, Industrial and Scientic, Musical Instruments,
Oce Products, Patio, Pet Supplies, Shoes, Sports and Outdoors, Tools and Home
Improvement, Toys and Games, and Watches. I specically avoid using reviews from
the Music, Movies, and Video categories because of the dicult nature of disentan-
gling the reputation of the artist from the reputation of the company selling the
product.
Since not all reviews convey new or especially valuable information, many of my
tests limit the measure of reputation to only Helpful reviews. I use Helpful reviews in
much of my analysis because of the noise that can arise from other reviews. Shoppers
at Amazon.com will occasionally notice reviews that are either unhelpful, uninformed,
fake, or simply posted in the wrong place.7 Illegitimate reviews are a minor concern
5The product reviews are similar to those used in McAuley and Leskovec (2013) and Huang
(2018).
6Since the time of data collection Amazon has changed this process to only allow upvotes.
7There have been companies that have emerged as posters of fake reviews for sellers (e.g.,
www.buyamazonreviews.com). The sellers that purchase these reviews though are smaller and
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considering Amazon's aggressive legal pursuit of those who write fake reviews.8 Even
though this noise aects only a small subsample of the reviews, I use Helpful ratings
as a robustness.
Chen, Dhanasobhon, and Smith (2008) study reviews on Amazon.com and nd
that helpful reviews inuence the purchasing decisions of consumers more than other
reviews. Using helpful reviews then provides me with a more precise measure, though
the cost of using the measure is a reduction of power in the tests.
For each ASIN, I scrape the Amazon site using a Python script for the name
of either the rm that sells the product or the brand that is associated with the
product. The initial dataset consists of approximately 4.3 million reviews written
on about 400,000 products from 1999 to 2012.9 Though the data spans more than
a decade, most of the observations are concentrated in the second half of the time
series, representing the rise in popularity of the site.
I am unable to collect company information for about 3.5% of the products because
they do not have a functioning web page, and only 1.8% of the products do not have
company or brand information listed on the page. Though a small portion of the
products do not have a functioning web page, survivorship bias is a minor concern
since the vast majority of discontinued products remain on the Amazon site and can
be referenced at any time.
An example observation is given in Appendix A. At the top of the product de-
scription, just below the product name, there is a byline with the name of the pro-
ducer/brand. In this example observation the product is the iPod Classic, and Apple
is listed as the maker of the product. At the time, over 3,000 reviews had been written
for this iPod, with an average review of about 4.5 stars over the life of the product.
The average rating displayed on the Amazon Website is a proprietary weighted aver-
age of all reviews of the product, with weight given to more recent and more helpful
reviews. In order to test within-rm variation in product market reputation, I build
an annual measure of reputation using only the reviews written in the year.
Below the product description is an example review of the product. Alex (the
reviewer) gives the product ve stars because of the impressive storage space and the
reliability relative to other products. Above Alex's star rating there is also a line that
says 1,651 people out of 1,696 voted the review as helpful.
For many products the name of the rm is not listed on the byline. Instead it
contains either a subsidiary or a brand (e.g., Gillette razors are manufactured and
sold by the company Proctor & Gamble). For these observations I use a combination
of LexisNexis and Google searches to identify the parent company. I do this for
a majority of the reviews with brand and subsidiary information instead of rm
information.
usually private companies. Since my analysis focuses on larger public companies this does not
pose an issue.
8http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-sues-sellers-for-oering-fake-goods-on-its-site-
1479243852
9I drop Amazon.com, the company, from my sample since it has been shown that Amazon
manipulates its product market positions in relation to products from competitors on the site (Zhu
and Liu, 2018).
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Figure 1.1 plots the number of reviews posted in the Amazon.com markets through
time. The number of reviews posted on Amazon exploded throughout the decade
ending in 2007, before plateauing at about 50,000 reviews each year. The dark blue
bars represent the total number of reviews posted each year. The lighter beige bars
represent the number of reviews that are designated as Helpful each year. In order
for a review to be designated as Helpful at least 50 percent of the voters must classify
it as such. It is important to note here that the decline in helpful reviews after 2007
is mechanical and not related to changing review quality through time. A review
written in 2007 had years to collect votes, whereas a review written in 2012 only had
months to collect user votes.
I then match the product reviews data with data from the Center for Research
on Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat using company names. Prior to the name
match I clean the names by dropping punctuation (e.g., ., -, &) and certain words
(e.g., corporation, incorporated). I only keep observations that match perfectly
on these cleaned names.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics on the Amazon data. Panel A presents
information on the products in the sample, and Panel B presents information on
the rms in the sample. The initial sample covers approximately 400,000 products.
However, many of the products are sold by private companies, and many observations
do not survive the perfect name match. I also require that the rm be included in
the ISS Incentive Lab data which contains information on executive compensation.
The ISS Incentive Lab data covers the S&P 500 as well as a signicant portion of
the S&P 400. After imposing these lters the dataset covers approximately 12,000
products from 90 companies from 1999 to 2012. The mean product has an average
rating of 3.95 stars out of ve and has about 26 reviews (half of which are Helpful).
The typical product has a lifetime on the site of ve years.10
In Panel B, the median rm has 94 products, introduces 3.7 products each year,
and drops 2.4 products each year. The typical rm also has over 200 reviews written
about its products and has an average rating of just under 4 stars. These variables
are highly skewed.
The Amazon dataset of reviews was originally scraped in 201311, so any products
that were introduced on Amazon.com and then subsequently removed prior to 2013
would not be in my sample and could potentially bias my results. There are two
reasons this concern is signicantly lessened. First, I incorporate tests which include
product xed eects, which limit my analysis to within-product reputation responses
to myopia.
Second, Amazon tends to leave products on its site even when they are no longer
sold. In the data there are many instances of unsuccessful products that were only
sold on Amazon for a short period of time. Though they would not be include in my
tests, examples can be found of products that received a single review but remain on
the Amazon site for years. I do, however, nd few instances of product removal. But
10I use the year of the rst review as the year the product was introduced, and I consider a
product discontinued when it no longer receives ratings.
11For more information about the scraping process and original use of the data in a recommender
systems setting, see McAuley and Leskovec (2013)
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even if these cases were widespread, it would bias my estimates downward. If myopia
aects reputation in a signicant enough way to cause the product to drop out of my
sample then my estimates on the treatment eect would be too low.
1.2.2 Equity Vesting Data
My primary measure of changes to the CEO incentive structure is their vesting of
stock and options. As part of the compensation plan a CEO will frequently be
awarded equity and option grants that vest at regular intervals. Many times the
vesting payment will only take place if certain accounting goals have been met. These
performance-based grants are frequently intricate and elaborate. For the sake of
simplicity I omit these types of payments from my analysis. I instead focus on time-
based grants since these contracts are typically awarded years in advance and are not
based on any performance criteria.
Within time-based plans, grants can vest with either a cli schedule or a ratable
schedule. Ratable schedules pay a portion of the grant on a recurring basis (typically
annually) while cli schedules pay a lump sum on the vesting date. I limit my analysis
to the most plausibly exogenous subset of vesting payments: time-based grants with
a cli schedule. I also require that these grants be awarded at least a year in advance
of the vesting date. Many of these grants vest 3-5 years after the award date.
Previous work has already used similar measures as a proxy for the CEO's short-
term concern for the stock price. CEOs typically sell a large amount of equity in
years in which they receive vesting payments. It is this large degree of selling that
creates the incentive to focus on the short-term stock price. Moore (2018) nds that
rms are more likely to repurchase stock if the CEO has vesting equity in the period,
and Edmans et al. (2017) use similar vesting data to show that the rate of investment
in R&D and CAPEX is reduced when CEO equity vests.
I create three vesting event variables to measure shocks to short-term incentives.
Any Vesting Event (CEO) is set to 1 in any year in which the rm's CEO has either
a stock vesting event or an option vesting event that is time-based with a cli vesting
schedule. I then decompose this measure into its two components: Any Stock Vesting
(CEO) and Any Option Vesting (CEO). I make similar variables for vesting events
for any of the executives at the rm.12 Panel A of Table 1.2 reports the percent of
rm-years aected by each type of vesting event. In my sample approximately one
fourth of rm-years have a CEO vesting event, 17% have a stock vesting event, and
11% have an option vesting event. While some form of vesting is likely occurring
every year for large companies, the frequency of these vesting events is much lower
since I focus on the events that are the most plausibly exogenous.
1.2.3 Institutional Ownership Classication and Controls
As an alternative measure of short-termism I use institutional ownership as catego-
rized by Bushee (2001). He examines the portfolio diversity as well as the portfolio
12In untabulated results I use a measure that includes awards for all executives. The inferences
remain the same, though the magnitude of the eect is approximately two thirds the size.
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turnover of institutions to identify transient owners (high diversity, high turnover),
dedicated owners (low diversity, low turnover), and quasi indexers (high diversity, low
turnover). I obtain these classications from his website and merge them into the
Thompson Reuters 13F holdings data to build a rm-year measure of each type of
owner. Panel B of Table 1.2 reports summary statistics on the ownership variables.
In the nal sample, the average rm-year has just over 50% of its shares owned by
Quasi Indexers, approximately 15% owned by Transient institutions, and under 4%
owned by Dedicated institutions.
From CRSP, I use data on returns, prices, volume, and shares outstanding. I also
merge with Compustat to get data on assets, liabilities, advertising expense, cash,
sales, R&D, and book value per share. Summary statistics for control variables are
also reported in Table 1.2.
Following Sheen (2014), I include LN(Market Cap), Leverage, R&D, and Operating
Margin as controls in my analysis. I also use Book-to-Market and 12-month Return.
LN(Market Cap) is the natural log of price times shares outstanding. Leverage is
total liabilities divided by total assets. R&D is research and development expenses
scaled by the previous year's sales. Operating Margin is operating income before
depreciation scaled by the previous year's sales. Book-to-Market is the book value
per share divided by the price per share. 12-month Return is the return on the
company's stock over the prior 12 months.
For the interacted tests I also include Bad Reputation which is an indicator equal
to 1 if the rm is in the lowest quartile of reputation for the year as measured by
Amazon.com reviews, High Leverage which is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
rm is above the median leverage ratio for the year, Old CEO which is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is over 50 years of age, and High Advertising which
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the rm is in the top quartile of advertising
expenses.
1.3 Identication Strategy
In order to test the causal eect of myopia on product market reputation, I use stock
and option vesting events. The timing of these vesting events has been shown to be
plausibly exogenous to contemporanous factors since they are usually set up years
in advance. I use the subset of events that is most exogenous as a parsimonious
indicator variable. Many of the grants awarded to CEOs are based on performance
measures, but some are strictly time-based grants that vest according to a predeter-
mined schedule. I restrict my sample to time-based grants.
Within time-based grants, awards can vest with either a cli schedule or a ratable
schedule. Since cli schedules have the largest portion of the award further into the
future, the future payments are arguably more exogenous to the rm conditions at
the time of vesting. In order for an endogeneity problem to exist, the compensa-
tion committee would have to be able to accurately and systematically forecast rm
conditions and the reputational environment years in the future. This is unlikely.
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1.3.1 Panel Specications
My primary dependent variable is one-year ahead product market reputation. As
robustness checks I also use two-years ahead reputation and a reputation measure
built using only Helpful reviews. I use a forward looking dependent variable since
Sheen (2014) nds that following a merger the quality of products between the two
companies converges, but this convergence takes about two to three years to mate-
rialize. Changes made to the product lineup cannot be immediately reected in the
product market since changes take time to make their way through the manufactur-
ing process. However, this change would occur more rapidly when a rm is not also
concerned about combining the resources of another company.
The model I formally test is:
Reputationi,j,t+1 = β0 + β1Vesting Eventi,t + γXi,t + θi + φt + εi,t (1.1)
where i indexes the rm, j indexes the product, t indexes the year, Xi,t is a vector of
control variables, θi represents the time-invariant rm xed eect, and φt is the year
xed eect that accounts for annual factors that could impact all observations in a
year. Reputation is measured as the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to that
product in the subsequent year. In other specications I decompose Vesting Event
into its stock and option components, and in later tests I replace the Vesting Event
indicator variable with varying measures of institutional ownership types. Standard
errors are clustered by product in order to address the potentially correlated error
terms within the groups.13
In my second set of tests I attempt to understand the mechanism through which
reputation is aected. A rm could respond by changing the existing products or
changing the product lineup by increasing/decreasing the number of products they
introduce/drop each year. In order to test the rst hypothesis I rerun Equation (1.1)
including product xed eects (which subsume the rm xed eect).
In order to determine whether the product lineup is changing, I employ a rm-year
panel and estimate the following model:
∆Characteristici,t = β0 + β1Vesting Eventi,t + γXi,t + θi + εi,t (1.2)
where i indexes the rm, t indexes the year, Xi,t is a vector of control variables,
and θi represents the time-invariant rm xed eect. Characteristici,t is either Num-
ber of Products, Number of New Products, or Number of Dropped Products depending
on the specication. In some specications I again decompose Vesting Event into
its stock and option components. Standard errors are clustered by rm in order to
address the potentially correlated error terms within the groups. Given that the de-
pendent variable measures the change in the characteristic and that the model uses
rm xed eects, the β1 estimate measures how the event impacts the rate of change
of the characteristic.
My nal set of tests explore the dierential eect that myopia has across several
measures: High Leverage, Old CEO, High Advertising, and Bad Reputation. I use
13See Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Petersen (2009).
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the exogenous specication of Equation (1.1), but include estimates on the interacted
coecients as well.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Main Results
My rst set of tests, using the vesting events as exogenous shocks to myopic incen-
tives, are presented in Table 1.3. In the rst two specications the outcome variable
of interest is product market reputation in the subsequent year. The next two spec-
ications examine the eect two years ahead, and the nal two limit the measure
of reputation to only include Helpful reviews. Odd numbered specications use Any
Vesting Event as the shock to myopia, while the even numbered specications split
the indicator into its stock and option components. As stated in the discussion of
Equation (1.1), rm and year xed eects are included, and standard errors, clustered
by product, are reported in parentheses.
Results are consistent across all specications.14 The estimate on Any Vesting
Event is negative and statistically signicant at the one percent level in all three
specications. The magnitude of the Stock Vesting estimate is slightly larger (though
the dierence is not signicantly dierent from zero) and also statistically signicant.
The estimates for the coecients on Option Vesting are indistinguishable from zero.
These results are consistent with myopia negatively impacting reputation, and they
are also consistent with Edmans et al. (2017) who nd that the reduction in physical
investment is concentrated primarily in the stock vesting.15
The lack of signicance on the Option Vesting is not surprising. Many of these
option vesting events grant the CEO an option that is out of the money. In these
instances, the CEO does not experience a myopic shock.
The magnitudes on the estimates are also economically meaningful. A stock
vesting event to the CEO is associated with an average decline of 0.10 stars in the
next year's average rating, or 10% of the unconditional average interquartile range.
1.4.2 Mechanism
Table 1.4 repeats the analysis using product xed eects instead of rm xed eects
to test the product deterioration hypothesis. The quantitative results are similar,
but the interpretation is slightly dierent. The tests provide evidence that following
short-term incentive shocks, individual products deteriorate. Multiple explanations
exist for this deterioration. Two potential explanations are that the manufacturing
process may be altered, or perhaps the rm reduced customer service for the product
following sales. Either way, the reputation of the product among consumers declines.
Table 1.5 estimates Equation (1.2). Again, even specications decompose the
vesting event variable into its stock and option components. Specications (3) and (4)
14See Internet Appendix Table IA1.1 for control variable details.
15Internet Appendix Table IA1.2 repeats this analysis using all executives instead of just the
CEO.
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use two-year ahead reputation as the dependent variable, and specications (5) and
(6) limit the reputation measure to only include Helpful reviews. In all specications
standard errors are clustered at the rm level and reported in parentheses.
The results are consistent with the risk aversion story. Firms with CEOs who are
shocked with a short-term incentive change reduce the number of products they oer.
Specications (3) and (4) show that this reduction in the number of products is due
to a reduction in the rate at which new products are released. Since releasing new
products is a risky activity, CEOs appear to be reducing their risk-taking to protect
the stock price in vesting years.
1.4.3 Cross-Sectional Variation in Myopia and Reputation
The next set of tests repeats specications (1) and (2) from Table 1.3 with interacted
indicator variables. Table 1.6 reports results from testing whether or not there is a
dierential eect across rms with existing short-term pressures. Table 1.7 reports re-
sults from testing whether or not there is a dierential eect across other reputational
factors.
CEOs that are older and closer to retirement have less of an incentive to care
about the long-run rm prospects, which in turn could mean that they are more
likely to be aected by these incentive shocks. Similarly, Matsa (2011) shows that
CEOs of highly levered supermarket rms, with a near-term concern about cash ow
for debt service, reduce quality to conserve cash. Consistent with these hypotheses,
I nd that the negative reputational shock in the product market is largest for rms
with an older CEO and rms with high leverage.
Consistent with the notion of diminishing marginal returns to investment in rep-
utation, I nd that the shock to short-term incentives has more severe consequences
for rms who already have a bad reputation. This is consistent with the ndings of
Larkin (2013) that higher brand loyalty is associated with a more inelastic demand
curve on the part of the consumers. Firms with a high reputation are able to weather
a storm better than poorly-perceived rms. This hypothesis is also supported by
the results that show the eect is mitigated when rms spend more on advertising.
Higher advertising expenses appear to safeguard the rm against these reputational
consequences.
1.4.4 Institutional Ownership
In the last set of tests I use an alternative empirical strategy, looking instead at in-
stitutional ownership and its eect on product market reputation. Several papers
have used institutional ownership as a measure of rm myopia.16 I decompose insti-
tutional ownership into separate components since the time horizon of the owner has
been shown to aect rm behavior. Bushee (2001) classies institutional owners into
Transient, Dedicated, and Quasi Indexers. These classication are available on his
Website. Table 1.8 presents the results.
16See, e.g., Cella (2009), Bushee (1998), Derrien, Kecskés, and Thesmar (2013).
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The two measures of interest are Dedicated Ownership and Transient Ownership.
Dedicated Ownership measures the fraction of shares outstanding that are owned
by institutional owners with long investing horizons and low levels of diversication,
while Transient Ownership measures the fraction of shares outstanding that are owned
by institutional owners with short investing horizons and high levels of diversication.
Investors classied as Quasi Indexers have long investing horizons and high levels of
diversication.
Increases to Dedicated Ownership predict higher product market reputation. The
opposite result holds for Transient Ownership. Limiting the measure of reputation to
Helpful reviews, the interpretation and inferences hold. When a rm has an increase
in owners with a short-term focus its product market reputation declines.
The institutional ownership specications do face an endogeneity problem, how-
ever. It is possible that dedicated institutions are particularly good at targeting rms
with better future prospects and that institutions are not actually aecting myopia
at all. However, Edmans (2009) argues that simply the threat of exit by these large
institutions causes management to focus on the long-term. If management decides
to act myopically then these institutions will vote with their feet and add selling
pressure to the stock, thus reducing the incentive to act myopically. At a minimum
these tests provide additional evidence in support of the conclusions reached in the
primary analysis.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper I examine a rm's product market consequences when its management
has myopic, or short-term, incentives. Specically, I nd that the rm's product
market reputation is negatively impacted when the rm's management has short-
term vesting incentives in the current year. In my primary tests I use the exogenous
vesting of options and stock grants to the rm's CEO. These vesting events are set up
years in advance and are therefore unlikely to be related to current product market
outcomes. I nd evidence that this decline is driven by a deteriorating of existing
products (cost cutting) as well as changes to the rm's product lineup (risk aversion).
I nd that the negative reputational shock in the product market is largest for
rms with an older CEO and rms with high leverage. Consistent with the notion
of diminishing marginal returns to investment in reputation, I nd that the shock to
short-term incentives has more severe consequences for rms who already have a bad
reputation, though higher advertising expenses appear to safeguard the rm against
these reputational consequences.
I use the composition of the rm's ownership as an alternative empirical method-
ology to estimate the degree of short-term focus. Previous work has shown that
rms with transient owners are on average more preoccupied with near-term results,
while rms with more dedicated ownership are not. These results conrm the initial
ndings that a rm's myopic focus negatively impacts its reputation in the product
market.
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Table 1.1: Amazon Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on Amazon variables. Product variables are
in Panel A while rm variables are in Panel B. Average Rating measures the average
number of stars (out of ve) assigned by users to either the product or the rm.
Average Rating from Helpful uses only reviews that were classied as Helpful by
Amazon voters. Also included are the number of reviews, number of helpful reviews,
number of products, average product lifespan, and the average number of products
introduced and dropped each year by the typical rm.
Panel A: Product variables
Mean Q1 Median Q3 N
Average Rating 3.952 3.500 4.091 4.500 12,309
Average Rating from Helpful 3.951 3.500 4.111 4.714 11,340
Reviews 26.07 3 7 20 12,309
Helpful Reviews 13.97 2 4 11 12,309
Product Life (years) 5.540 3 5 7 12,309
Panel B: Firm variables
Mean Q1 Median Q3 N
Products 869.2 15 94 748 90
Yearly New Products 23.21 0.895 3.734 21.96 90
Yearly Dropped Products 16.94 0.429 2.417 16.52 90
Average Rating 3.904 3.667 4.008 4.199 90
Average Rating from Helpful 3.856 3.580 3.948 4.200 90
Reviews 3,745 24 220.5 4,203 90
Helpful Reviews 2,007 9 124.5 2,137 90
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Table 1.2: Firm-Year Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics on the measures of short-term incentives as
well as other variables used in the analysis. Panel A presents the percent of rm-years
aected by vesting events as dened in the paper. Any Vesting Event (CEO) is set
to 1 in a year where a time-based grant with a cli schedule vests to the CEO. The
grant must be set up at least one year in advance. Any Vesting Event (All Execs) is
dened similarly, but includes vesting to all executives. The measures are also split
into their stock and option components. The mean, median, 25th percentile, and 75th
percentile, along with the number of associated rm-years, are reported in Panel B
for other variables used in the analysis. See the data section for detailed variable
denitions.
Panel A: Vesting events
%
Any Vesting Event (CEO) 24.8
Any Vesting Event (All Execs) 36.4
Any Stock Vesting (CEO) 17.0
Any Stock Vesting (All Execs) 26.4
Any Option Vesting (CEO) 11.3
Any Option Vesting (All Execs) 15.8
Panel B: Firm controls
Mean Q1 Median Q3 N
Market Cap (millions) 30,672 2,152 5,128 19,903 698
Book-to-Market 0.374 0.218 0.348 0.517 698
Leverage 0.598 0.437 0.593 0.730 698
12-month Return 0.122 -0.172 0.0683 0.308 698
Advertising Expense 0.0410 0.00997 0.0247 0.0515 482
Operating Margin 0.164 0.112 0.153 0.222 698
R&D 0.0616 0.0155 0.0320 0.0868 698
Short Interest Ratio 0.0384 0.0139 0.0266 0.0475 671
Dedicated Ownership 0.0376 0.00001 0.00160 0.0591 620
Transient Ownership 0.163 0.0886 0.139 0.213 620
Quasi Index Ownership 0.518 0.413 0.532 0.639 620
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Table 1.3: Do Vesting Events Predict Product Market Reputation?
This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1.1) and its variants. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2)
is measured as the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product in the subsequent year. The second and third
sets of specications use two-year ahead product market reputation and the reputation as measured by the Helpful reviews,
respectively. Any Vesting Event is an indicator variable set to 1 in any year in which the rm's CEO has either a stock vesting
event or an option vesting event. Any Stock Vesting and Any Option Vesting decompose Any Vesting Event accordingly. See
the data section for detailed variable denitions. Control variables are included in the specications and dened in the text.
Indicators for xed eects are reported at the bottom of the table, and standard errors, clustered at the product level, are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks represent the conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1 Reputationt+2 Helpful Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Vesting Event -0.067∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.017)
Stock Vesting -0.101∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
Option Vesting 0.022 0.035 -0.008
(0.029) (0.037) (0.031)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.067
Observations 52,924 52,924 40,646 40,646 50,168 50,168
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Table 1.4: Within-Product Decline
This table repeats the analysis from Table 1.3 using product xed eects instead of rm xed eects. Control variables are
included in the specications and dened in the text. Indicators for xed eects are reported beneath the panels. Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the product level. Asterisks represent the conventional levels of statistical
signicance.
Reputationt+1 Reputationt+2 Helpful Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Vesting Event -0.054*** -0.017 -0.045***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014)
Stock Vesting -0.079*** -0.038* -0.059***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.016)
Option Vesting 0.031 0.030 0.014
(0.027) (0.031) (0.026)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.528 0.529 0.542 0.542 0.687 0.687
Observations 50,400 50,400 38,961 38,961 48,032 48,032
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Table 1.5: Changing Product Lineup
This table presents results from estimating variants of Equation (1.2). ∆ Products is the one-year change in the number of
products listed by the rm. ∆ New Products is the change in the number of new products listed on Amazon by the company
in the year. ∆ Dropped Products is the change in the number of products that were reviewed in the previous year but not the
current year. Control variables are included in the specications and dened in the text. Indicators for xed eects are reported
below. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the rm level. Asterisks represent the conventional levels of
statistical signicance.
∆ Products ∆ New Products ∆ Dropped Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Vesting Event -4.12* -1.70 0.52
(2.23) (1.25) (0.72)
Stock Vesting -8.41*** -2.90** 0.77
(2.53) (1.23) (0.68)
Option Vesting 2.14 0.97 0.54
(3.68) (2.18) (1.77)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.27
Observations 732 732 647 647 647 647
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Table 1.6: Additional Short-Term Pressures
This table presents estimates from versions of specications (1) and (2) from Table 1.3.
The dependent variable is one-year-ahead product market reputation and is measured
as the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product. Near Retirement
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is over 50 years of age. High Leverage
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the rm is above the annual median leverage
ratio. Any Vesting Event is an indicator variable set to 1 in any year in which
the rm's CEO has either a stock vesting event or an option vesting event. Any
Stock Vesting and Any Option Vesting decompose Any Vesting Event accordingly.
Control variables are included in the specications and dened in the text, though
they are omitted for brevity. Indicators for xed eects are reported at the bottom
of the table, and standard errors, clustered by product, are reported in parentheses.
Asterisks represent the conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Vesting Event -0.0296 -0.0196
(0.0225) (0.0302)
Stock Vesting Event -0.0358 -0.0385
(0.0283) (0.0318)
Any × Near Retirement -0.1226***
(0.0383)
Stock × Near Retirement -0.1225***
(0.0418)
Any × High Leverage -0.0663*
(0.0340)
Stock × High Leverage -0.0952***
(0.0362)
Near Retirement -0.0460* -0.0464*
(0.0269) (0.0272)
High Leverage -0.0769*** -0.0781***
(0.0183) (0.0182)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.063
Observations 37,107 37,107 52,924 52,924
19
Table 1.7: Existing Reputational Factors
This table presents estimates from versions of specications (1) and (2) from Table 1.3.
The dependent variable is one-year-ahead product market reputation and is measured
as the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product. Low Reputation is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the rm is in the lowest annual quartile of reputation
as measured by Amazon.com reviews. High Advertising is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the rm is in the top annual quartile of advertising expenses. Any Vesting
Event is an indicator variable set to 1 in any year in which the rm's CEO has either
a stock vesting event or an option vesting event. Any Stock Vesting and Any Option
Vesting decompose Any Vesting Event accordingly. Control variables are included
in the specications and dened in the text, though they are omitted for brevity.
Indicators for xed eects are reported at the bottom of the table, and standard
errors, clustered by product, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks represent the
conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Vesting Event -0.0638*** -0.0572***
(0.0176) (0.0212)
Stock Vesting Event -0.0903*** -0.1003***
(0.0203) (0.0244)
Any × Low Reputation -0.2379**
(0.1008)
Stock × Low Reputation -0.2065**
(0.1031)
Any × High Advertising 0.0822**
(0.0405)
Stock × High Advertising 0.1206**
(0.0498)
Low Reputation -0.2413*** -0.2420***
(0.0314) (0.0312)
High Advertising 0.0575 0.0666
(0.0411) (0.0407)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.065 0.065 0.053 0.053
Observations 52,924 52,924 46,382 46,382
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Table 1.8: Does Institutional Ownership Predict Product Market Reputation?
This table presents estimates of the eect of institutional ownership on product market reputation. The dependent variable
in columns (1) and (2) is measured as the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product in the subsequent year.
The second and third sets of specications use two-year ahead product market reputation and the reputation as measured by
the Helpful reviews, respectively. Transient, Dedicated, and Quasi Indexer measure the fraction of shares outstanding that
are owned by institutional owners who have been classied as such as in Bushee (2001). Control variables are included in
the specications and dened in the text, though they are omitted for brevity. Indicators for xed eects are reported at the
bottom of the table, and standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks represent the
conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1 Reputationt+2 Helpful Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Transient -0.174*** -0.017 -0.367***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.069)
Dedicated 0.953*** 0.738*** 1.118***
(0.123) (0.137) (0.126)
Quasi Indexer -0.262*** -0.495*** -0.099*
(0.052) (0.067) (0.054)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.080 0.081 0.080
Observations 79,319 79,319 79,319 61,951 61,951 61,951 75,342 75,342 75,342
21
Figure 1.1: Number of Reviews Posted on Amazon.com in Selected Categories
This chart plots the time series of reviews posted on Amazon.com in any of the
following categories: Arts, Automotive, Baby, Beauty, Cell Phones and Accessories,
Clothing and Accessories, Electronics, Gourmet Foods, Health, Home and Kitchen,
Industrial and Scientic, Musical Instruments, Oce Products, Patio, Pet Supplies,
Shoes, Sports and Outdoors, Tools and Home Improvement, Toys and Games, and
Watches. The solid black line represents the total number of reviews posted each
year. The dashed blue line represents the number of reviews each year which were
classied as Helpful by other users. In order for a review to be classied as Helpful
at least 50 percent of the voters must have designated it as such.
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
All Reviews Helpful Reviews
Copyright c© Tyson D. Van Alfen, 2019.
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Chapter 2 Real Estate Shocks and Financial Advisor Misconduct
2.1 Introduction
Do household level nancial shocks cause employees to commit nancial misconduct?
Anecdotal evidence has long suggested a relation between nancial well-being and
deviant behavior. Indeed, over two thousand years ago Aristotle called poverty the
parent of crime. More recently, in a series of interviews with professionals convicted
of white collar crimes, Cressey (1971) found that nancial pressure nearly always pre-
ceded misconduct. Interpreting the observed relation between nancial pressure and
misconduct is challenging, however, because nancial pressure is often the result of
the individual's own choices. For example, Cressey (1971) found that nancial pres-
sure was primarily due to gambling, alcoholism, drug use, and extravagant spending.
Thus, it is unclear if negative nancial shocks cause misconduct or if they are both
symptoms of the same underlying personality traits or preferences.
Theory also does not provide denitive guidance, because the eect of wealth
shocks on misconduct is ambiguous without strong assumptions about utility. On
the one hand, nancial misconduct is a risky activity; it could create illicit gains,
but could result in penalties and negative career consequences.1 Under decreasing
absolute risk aversion, negative wealth shocks increase sensitivity to risk, implying
less willingness to engage in misconduct. On the other hand, Block and Heineke
(1975) show that, if individuals have ethical preferences, the relation between wealth
and misconduct is considerably more complicated, and the eect of a wealth shock
depends upon whether ethical behavior is a normal or an inferior good. Their model
further shows that understanding the relation between wealth and misconduct is
critical for evaluating policy responses.
Ultimately, whether nancial pressure causes misconduct is an empirical question
that can only be tested with exogenous wealth shocks. In this paper, we use plausibly
exogenous shocks to nancial advisors' wealth based on housing price shocks. We use
a series of xed eect strategies to exploit within advisor, within ZIP code, and within
rm-year variation to identify whether household wealth shocks aect the propensity
of nancial advisors to engage in misconduct.
We examine the nancial advisory industry for several reasons. First, advisors
have large eects on household nancial well-being. Hung, Clancy, Dominitz, Talley,
Berribi, and Suvankulov (2008) show that the majority of individual investors consult
an advisor for nancial decisions, and Foerster, Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero
(2017) show advisors strongly inuence household portfolio choice. Given this key
role in facilitating household access to nancial markets, it is critical that households
are able to trust their advisor with their money (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny,
2015). Second, advisors are primarily compensated through commissions, which cre-
1Prior studies showing negative career consequences for nancial misconduct include Egan,
Matvos, and Seru (2018a) for nancial advisors, Karpo, Lee, and Martin (2008) for corporate
executives, and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) for corporate directors.
23
ates conicts of interest and incentives for misconduct.2 Empirical studies such as
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) and Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) show
that misconduct in this industry is common. A surprisingly high fraction of advisors
have a history of exploiting their clients through activities such as churning, unautho-
rized trading, misrepresentation, and selling unsuitable investments. Third, the data
for this industry allow us to link misconduct to specic individuals within a rm.
Our data come from detailed mandatory disclosure lings made by nancial ad-
visors, which identify nancial misconduct committed by specic advisors as well as
their employment histories (see Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham, 2018; Egan, Matvos,
and Seru, 2018a,b). In addition, these mandated lings also include the advisors'
home addresses and the dates of residency. We combine the advisor addresses with
ZIP code level house price indexes created by Zillow and impute a purchase price and
time-series of house price returns for each advisor in the sample.3
We use house price returns as exogenous shocks to nancial advisors' personal
wealth. For our purposes, we require a shock that is both unanticipated and eco-
nomically meaningful. Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014) analyze whether midlevel
managers working in securitized nance believed there was a housing bubble in 2004
2006 by examining the managers' personal home transactions; they nd no evidence
that these individuals anticipated the housing crisis. A large literature shows that
housing price uctuations have large, economically meaningful eects on consumption
(see Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek, 2011; Mian, Rao, and
Su, 2013; DeFusco, 2018). Gan (2010) shows that housing shocks aect consumption
even for households that do not renance, and argues this is consistent with changes
in precautionary savings due to real estate wealth eects. Thus, real estate shocks
appear to be both unexpected and economically meaningful.
Following other studies on risk taking by professionals around the housing cri-
sis (Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend, 2018; Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang,
2018), we estimate dierences-in-dierences models, in which we regress changes in
an advisor's misconduct on his housing price shock during the nancial crisis. These
specications include rm xed eects, which control for potential confounding vari-
ation among employees within a rm (e.g., if within-rm incentives to commit mis-
conduct change during the nancial crisis). The results show that advisors who suer
larger housing price declines subsequently increase their commission of misconduct.
For example, advisors who suer a price decline of 10% or more increase misconduct
by 41% relative to advisors with smaller price declines.
We then extend the dierences-in-dierences results to xed eect panel regres-
sions using cumulative housing returns since purchase. In these tests, the unit of
observation is advisor-year, which allows us to use housing price declines that oc-
2See Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012),
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012), Chalmers and Reuter (2015),
and Hoechle, Ruenzi, Schaub, and Schmid (2018).
3In robustness tests, we show that the imputed house price returns are a highly signicant
predictor of actual bankruptcies led by nancial advisors. We also have a subsample of advisors
for whom we have residence-specic Zillow valuation estimates. We nd that the average time series
correlation between the residence-specic price changes and the ZIP code price changes is 0.803.
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curred at any point during the 19992013 period. These specications include ad-
visor, rm-year, and ZIP code xed eects. The advisor xed eects remove the
advisor's overall propensity to commit misconduct, as well as individual characteris-
tics such as gender, education, and religious background. The rm-year xed eects
remove variation from the employing rms' tolerance of misconduct or its business
model (even if these eects are time-varying). The rm-year xed eects also remove
any time-series changes that aect all advisors, such as the overall economy. The ZIP
code xed eects remove the characteristics of the area, such as demographics, local
culture, state-level regulation, etc. The panel regression results are consistent with
the dierences-in-dierences test: advisors who suer negative house price shocks
are signicantly more likely to commit misconduct. Additional results show that the
relation between cumulative housing returns and misconduct is non-linear and that
misconduct is signicantly more sensitive to large losses on housing.
In the next set of tests, we exploit our ability to observe each advisor's cumulative
housing return since purchase. Even advisors living in the same ZIP code at the
same time can have very dierent cumulative housing returns. For example, consider
two advisors living in the same ZIP code in 2008 but who purchased their homes
at dierent times. Although prices declined in 2008, an advisor who purchased a
home in 1986 would likely have a positive cumulative return, while an advisor who
purchased a home in 2006 would likely have a negative cumulative return. This
variation in cumulative returns across advisors in the same ZIP code during the same
year allows us to include ZIP-year xed eects to remove any local time-varying
confounding variation, such as shocks to the home prices of the local customer base.
In an additional test, we include branch-ZIP-year xed eects. In this specication,
the xed eects limit the comparison to advisors who live in the same ZIP code during
the same year, and who also work at the same branch of the same rm. Even with
these more stringent xed eects, we continue to nd that large negative cumulative
returns are associated with higher misconduct.
In our next tests, we use two alternative dependent variables based on misconduct
reported by non-local parties. This alleviates concerns about the commonality of the
home price shock suered by the advisor and the shock suered by local customers.
First, we limit the dependent variable to include only instances of misconduct for
which the advisor and the customer live in dierent states. Second, we dene mis-
conduct as either a nalized regulatory sanction or a termination of the advisor by his
employer (and exclude all advisor-year observations that include a customer-driven
complaint to ensure this alternative dependent variable is distinct from the primary
dependent variable). For both of the alternative dependent variables, we continue to
nd a signicant negative relation between cumulative returns and misconduct.
We next examine cross-sectional variation in the risk that an advisor is terminated
for misconduct. Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a,b) show there is large variation in the
likelihood an advisor is terminated after committing misconduct  some rms are
more tolerant of misconduct and women are punished more severely than men. All
else equal, higher career risk implies a lower expected return to misconduct, reducing
the incentive to commit misconduct. Consistent with this intuition, we nd that the
relation between cumulative housing returns and misconduct is stronger for advisors
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who are less likely to be terminated if misconduct is detected.
We next explore the mechanism through which housing losses aect professional
misconduct. The relation could be caused by active misconduct, in which advisors
deliberately exploit clients for nancial gain. Alternatively, the relation could be
caused by passive misconduct, in which advisors harm clients through inattention
when they are distracted due to nancial distress. To test these competing mecha-
nisms, we categorize misconduct as active (misrepresentation, churning, unauthorized
trading, etc.) or passive (negligence or omission of key facts). We nd evidence of
passive misconduct, but more importantly we nd highly signicant evidence of active
misconduct; following housing losses, advisors deliberately exploit their clients.
In additional tests, we show that the results are robust to alternative denitions
of misconduct. We also validate our key independent variable by showing that our
measure of housing price shocks accurately predicts actual bankruptcy lings and
underwater home sales by nancial advisors.
Our paper is related to the recent literature on misconduct by nancial advisors.
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) show evidence of peer eects in misconduct;
nancial advisors are more likely to commit misconduct if they are exposed to co-
workers with a history of misconduct. Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) study how
misconduct aects the labor market for nancial advisors and nd that certain rms
specialize in misconduct while others strive to maintain clean reputations. Egan,
Matvos, and Seru (2018b) study gender dierences in the punishment for misconduct
and nd that following misconduct female advisors are more likely to be terminated
and less likely to nd new positions. Charoenwong, Kwan, and Umar (2018) show
that variation in regulatory oversight aects the propensity of advisors to engage
in misconduct. Cliord and Gerken (2018) show that the assignment of property
rights to client relationships reduces misconduct by advisors. In our paper, we show
that willingness to engage in misconduct is a pliable characteristic of the individual
advisor; advisors are more likely to commit misconduct when they are under personal
nancial pressure. Understanding such causes of nancial misconduct is important
for designing and implementing monitoring and regulatory systems.
Our paper is also related to several recent studies that show how personal nancial
issues aect professional behavior. Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang (2018) show
that mutual fund managers who suer negative shocks to their home's value subse-
quently reduce portfolio risk and tracking error. Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend
(2018) show that workers who suered larger losses on their house values during
the nancial crisis subsequently undertook less risky and less innovative projects.
Maturana and Nickerson (2018) show that when teachers declare bankruptcy, their
students' scores on standardized tests fall. Our paper also studies the eect of house-
hold nancial losses on professional behavior, but we study misconduct rather than
portfolio risk or productivity.
Our results show there are wealth eects in ethical behavior  a nding that has
implications for interpreting economic models of crime and misconduct (see Block
and Heineke, 1975). Extant empirical studies of crime and economic shocks largely
focus on labor markets, where the key issue is how labor market shocks aect the
substitution between time spent on labor versus criminal activity (see Chaln and
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McCrary, 2017). Relative to these studies, our setting has two unique features. First,
the wealth shock is not directly related to the return on labor or on misconduct.
Second, we study misconduct at work, and so the allocation of time between labor
and misconduct is not a relevant issue. These features allow us to clearly identify
wealth eects in ethical behavior, independent from the issue of time allocation.
We also document another important externality of housing price shocks. Aside
from the direct wealth eects of housing price declines, several papers document
less obvious adverse consequences. Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2011) show that
foreclosures have spillover eects that reduce the value of neighboring houses. Mian,
Rao, and Su (2013) highlight the decline in consumption following the housing
crisis. We show another externality  investors suer increased active misconduct
and passive mismanagement as a result of their nancial advisors' real estate price
shocks.
2.2 Data and Sample Construction
Our nancial advisor data come from a panel of mandatory disclosures made in Form
U4 lings. All registered representatives4 in the U.S. are required to le and update
these forms following any material changes. FINRA assigns each advisor a unique
individual permanent identier that allows us to track advisors even if they switch
employers. We obtain this panel through a combination of Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests led with state regulators by the authors, third-party data
obtained from a vendor (Meridian IQ), and the FINRA BrokerCheck Website.5 See
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) and Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a,b) for
detailed explanations of the data and industry.
The nancial advisor data include residential addresses for the 19992013 period,
as well as all misconduct disclosures made during the 19992017 period. The sample
includes 428,108 advisors with complete residential histories. We combine the advisor
data with ZIP code level housing price data from Zillow. However, because Zillow
does not provide the necessary data for all ZIP codes,6 our nal sample contains
329,418 advisors.
2.2.1 Financial Advisor Data
The Form U4 data includes each advisor's employment history, licenses, qualica-
tions, and any mandated disclosures. Advisors are required to disclose certain infor-
mation about customer complaints, regulatory actions, civil and criminal legal cases,
terminations, and bankruptcies. Table 2.1 summarizes this disclosure information.
4Registered representative is the term FINRA uses for these individuals. Following the recent
academic literature, in this paper we use the term nancial advisor. These individuals are also
commonly referred to as brokers or nancial planners.
5The BrokerCheck website allows investors to access a subset of the data reported in the Form
U4 lings. BrokerCheck does not report the advisors' home addresses. See https://brokercheck.
finra.org/.
6Since the Zillow data is also limited to the United States we are unable to include foreign
addresses.
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Columns (1) and (2) report the number of advisor-years with the disclosure and the
percentage, respectively. Column (3) reports the percent of advisors who make a
disclosure at any time during the sample period.
Following Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018), our primary measure of mis-
conduct is based on validated customer complaints. Customer complaints are formal
complaints, in which a customer demands compensation for damages caused by an
advisor's misconduct. Although some customer complaints allege negligence, most
complaints allege improper behavior taken to increase the advisor's compensation.
Financial advisors are compensated primarily based on the amount of revenue they
generate for their rm (see Hung, Clancy, Dominitz, Talley, Berribi, and Suvankulov,
2008), which creates strong incentives for advisors to generate trading commissions
or to sell products with high distribution fees. Theoretical models show that these
incentives encourage misconduct7 and empirical tests nd support for the models'
predictions.8
After a customer les a complaint, it can be resolved through arbitration, settle-
ment, or withdrawal. Following Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018), we create
the variable Misconduct based on customer disputes for which either the arbitration
panel rules in the customer's favor or the dispute is settled for at least a certain
minimum cash payment to the customer.9 Thus, this variable includes only customer
complaints that are validated either through an arbitration decision or a sizable mon-
etary payment (i.e., we do not include customer complaints that are withdrawn or
unresolved as of the end of our sample). Table 2.1 shows that 0.63% of advisor-years
and 4.66% of advisors in our nal sample report at least one Misconduct event.
Table 2.1 also summarizes additional disclosures that are used in several robust-
ness tests. Out-of-State Misconduct is a subcategory of the main Misconduct vari-
able, which includes only cases in which the customer and advisor live in dierent
states. Regulatory reports nalized regulatory sanctions from entities such as the
SEC, FINRA, or state regulators. Employment Separation After Allegations reports
whether the advisor has ever been terminated or permitted to resign following alle-
gations of misconduct.10
In robustness tests, we follow Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) and combine Mis-
conduct with Regulatory, Employment Separation After Allegations, and certain civil
7See Inderst and Ottaviani (2009, 2012) and Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2011).
8See Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Hackethal, Inderst, and Meyer (2011), Hack-
ethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012), Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012), Chalmers and Reuter
(2015), and Hoechle, Ruenzi, Schaub, and Schmid (2018).
9Financial advisors must report settlements of $10,000 or more before May 19, 2009 and set-
tlements of $15,000 or more afterwards. Settlements smaller than these thresholds need not be
disclosed, as they are potentially nuisance settlements and do not represent valid complaints.
10Employment Separation After Allegations occurs if the advisor is discharged, voluntarily resigns,
or is permitted to resign after allegations accusing the advisor of: (1) violating investment-related
statutes, regulations, rules, or industry standards of conduct; (2) fraud or wrongful taking of prop-
erty; or (3) failure to supervise in connection with investment-related statutes, regulations, rules,
or industry standards of conduct. For more details see https://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/AppSupportDoc/p015111.pdf.
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law and criminal disclosures,11 to create the variable EMS Misconduct. The summary
statistics show that 6.11% of advisors in our nal sample report at least one event
under the broader Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) denition.
Table 2.1 shows that 1.55% of advisors report a bankruptcy and 0.53% of advisors
report a compromise with creditors in relation to selling a home for less than the
outstanding mortgage amount (i.e., underwater sale). We use these variables as
checks of the validity of our primary measure of nancial distress.
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports additional summary statistics related to advisor
misconduct. For advisors with a settled or awarded customer complaint, the average
(median) alleged damages is $659,666 ($19,000) and the average (median) settlement
amount is $239,485 ($15,754). For advisors with regulatory sanctions, the average
(median) penalty is $13,125 ($5,000). Note that for approximately 40% of the cases
we are unable to observe settlement, award, or penalty amounts. In addition to
the misconduct information, Table 2.2 summarizes additional information from the
Form U4 lings. The median advisor has 10 years of industry experience, and in all
regressions we control for the logarithm of this variable.
2.2.2 Financial Advisor's Homes and Real Estate Price Shocks
The Form U4 disclosures include residence histories of the advisors' home addresses
and ZIP codes.12 Each advisor must report the address and dates of occupation for
each residency throughout the sample period. E.g., an advisor who has resided in the
same house since July of 1960 would report a move-in date of July 1960 even though
the sample period does not begin until 1999. We do not observe whether the advisor
rents or owns the home. However, robustness tests reported in Internet Appendix
1 that use proxies for the likelihood of ownership suggest it is unlikely that renting
materially aects our results.13
We led FOIA requests with all state regulators, however, numerous states did
not supply home addresses. As a result, we have home addresses only for advisors
who register in the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, or West Virginia.
11The civil law disclosures report court issued injunctions regarding investment-related activity,
ndings of a violation of any investment-related statute or regulation, and actions brought by a
state or foreign nancial regulatory authority that are dismissed by a court pursuant to a settlement
agreement. The criminal disclosures report any felony convictions or charges, as well as certain
misdemeanors such as bribery, perjury, fraud, or wrongful taking of property even if these occur
outside of their nancial advisory role.
12Section 11 of the Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration (Form U4) asks
advisors to provide their residential addresses for the past ve (5) years. Leave no gaps greater
than three (3) months between addresses. Begin by entering your current residential address. Enter
`Present' as the end date for your current address. Post Oce boxes are not acceptable. Report
changes as they occur.
13If measurement error from incorrectly assigning housing returns to renters is pure measurement
error, it will result in attenuation bias our results will understate the true eect. If, however, renting
is disproportionately associated with areas that had the largest price declines and is also positively
correlated with increased misconduct following price declines, this could bias upwards our results
(although it is not obvious why this correlation pattern would occur).
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Because advisors must register with each state in which they plan to do business, and
many advisors register in all states, we have home addresses of advisors in all 50 states
(e.g., we have home addresses for 69,167 advisors who live in New York and are reg-
istered in at least one state that provided data). Thus, although our sample of home
addresses is not comprehensive, it covers all major real estate markets. Importantly,
the selection mechanism is the state regulator's interpretation of The Privacy Act of
1974 as it relates to our FOIA request. It is not obvious that this selection mechanism
would be systematically related to the correlation between local housing shocks and
misconduct by nancial advisors, and thus we do not see reasonable concerns related
to selection bias.
We match the advisor residences to the Zillow ZIP code house price indexes. The
combined advisor-residence-Zillow price dataset spans 13,679 ZIP codes, which col-
lectively contain 74.7% of the U.S. population. Using the Zillow ZIP code indexes,
we impute a purchase price and annual price changes for each advisor-residence com-
bination.14 This approach is similar to that in Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend
(2018), who also impute individual house price shocks using ZIP code level price
indexes.15 In Internet Appendix 2, we also use the House Price Index produced by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency16 as an alternative measure of real estate prices
and nd similar results. For advisors who report multiple residences at the same
time (e.g., vacation homes), we use the purchase-price-weighted average return for all
residences. In Internet Appendix 3 we show our results are robust to using only the
highest value residence or excluding all advisor-years with multiple residencies.
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that the average house in the sample has an imputed
purchase price of $320,539 and a current price of $373,679. On average, the advisors
have lived in their current house for 5.8 years. Panel C reports the distribution of
annual house price changes. The median annual price change is $3,700, which is
1.72% of the beginning of year value. As the percentiles show, there is considerable
variation and many advisor-year observations experience negative returns.
We use the imputed purchase price and imputed annual returns to calculate the
cumulative return17 for each advisor-year. Importantly, this varies across advisors
even within a xed ZIP code depending upon when the advisors purchased their
house. For example, suppose Advisor A purchased a home in 2000 at an imputed
price of $200,000. House prices then doubled by 2007, when Advisor B purchased
a house at an imputed price of $400,000. The next year, house prices declined by
25% to $300,000. The cumulative return for Advisor A is +50%, but the cumulative
return for Advisor B is -25%. Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that the median cumulative
14Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang (2018) use house level imputed values from Zillow, instead
of ZIP code level imputation. This is feasible in their study as they have fewer than 1,000 individuals.
This approach is not feasible for us given our large sample size.
15Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend (2018) use the indexes developed by Bogin, Doerner, and
Larson (2018), but report that robustness results using the Zillow indexes are similar.
16See https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/pages/house-price-index.aspx.
17Our use of cumulative returns is similar to that of Gerardi, Herkenho, Ohanian, and Willen
(2018) who use cumulative returns (based on state-level housing indexes) as an instrument for
housing equity, who argue that cumulative returns avoid the endogeneity problems of loan-to-value
ratios (driven by homeowner's borrowing choices).
30
return is 9.72%, but the variation is large and many advisor-year observations have
negative cumulative returns. In our baseline specication, we focus on cumulative
returns for several reasons. First, it is natural to evaluate the current price relative
to the purchase price, due to the salience of the purchase price. Second, mortgages are
a function of purchase prices and so cumulative returns are important determinants
of whether an advisor is underwater. Third, because of variation in the timing of
purchases, cumulative returns vary across advisors within a ZIP code in any given
year, which allows for the inclusion of more stringent xed eects in some tests.
To summarize the time-series and regional variation in real estate prices during our
sample period, Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of nancial advisors who experience
an annual price decline of at least 10% during our sample period. The gure plots
results for the entire U.S. as well as for a few select states. There is a clear time-series
pattern. Negative real estate price shocks are concentrated around the housing market
crash of 20072009, although there is some variation across states in the timing of
the crash. For example, the peak of the housing market crash occurred earlier in
Nevada than in Illinois. There is also considerable cross-sectional variation: in 2008
real estate price shocks of 10% or worse aected more than 96% of advisors in Nevada
but fewer than 6% of advisors in Texas. The gure also shows that price declines are
not limited to the nancial crisis period; many advisors experience substantial price
declines in 2010 and 2011. Indeed, 70,537 advisors experience a 10% annual housing
price decline outside of the 20072009 period.
There is also large cross-sectional variation within states and even within metropoli-
tan statistical areas (MSA), as documented by Bogin, Doerner, and Larson (2018)
and Edlund, Machado, and Sviatschi (2019). For example, Figure 2.2 displays ZIP-
code level declines in housing prices for the Atlanta metropolitan area in 2008: the
hardest hit ZIP codes lost as much as 27%, while other (often nearby) ZIP codes had
negligible losses.
2.2.3 Real Estate Shocks and Misconduct by Financial Advisors
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 present simple visual summaries of the unconditional rela-
tion between real estate shocks and misconduct by nancial advisors. In Figure 2.3,
we categorize the advisor-year observations into ventiles based on the advisor's an-
nual house price change, with the average return within each ventile shown along the
x-axis. We then plot the average misconduct rate for each ventile. The dashed line
shows the unconditional average for the entire sample and the gray shaded area shows
the 95% condence interval (with standard errors clustered by individual and by ZIP
code). The annual return switches from negative to positive in the seventh ventile;
the misconduct rate increases as returns decline in the negative return region and is
largely at in the positive return region except for a small but insignicant increase
for the highest return ventiles.
In Figure 2.4, we plot the average misconduct rate in event time for the sample of
advisors who experience an annual house price shock of -10% or worse.18 The average
18If an advisor experiences multiple shocks of -10% or worse we include only the rst shock in
the gure.
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misconduct rate is at in the years before the shock, rises sharply in the year of the
shock, remains high for the next two years, and then reverts in the subsequent year.
Thus, the simple visual evidence in both gures is consistent with a relation between
real estate shocks and misconduct. Of course, this simple visual evidence should be
interpreted cautiously, as the gures do not control for potential confounding factors,
such as year eects, advisor characteristics, or regional dierences  issues we discuss
in the next section.
2.3 Identication Strategy
Identifying whether wealth shocks cause nancial advisors to commit misconduct is
complicated because of various unobservable factors that aect both housing prices
and misconduct. For example, Las Vegas has a high rate of nancial misconduct and
also suered large price declines during the nancial crisis. This does not necessarily
indicate a causal relation; possibly the type of person who chooses to live in Las
Vegas is also the type of person who commits misconduct. To remove the potential
eect of such unobservable variation, we use two identication strategies. First, we
use ZIP-code level housing return shocks and estimate a dierences-in-dierences
model. Second, in our primary specication we use individual-specic housing return
shocks based on cumulative housing returns since purchase and multiple xed eects
to remove confounding variation.
2.3.1 Dierences-in-Dierences
Following the identication strategy used by Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend
(2018) and Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang (2018), we examine cross-sectional
variation around the 2008 nancial crisis. Although the crisis aected all advisors in
our sample, as Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show, there was signicant cross-sectional
variation in its eect on local real estate prices. To exploit this variation, we estimate
the following dierences-in-dierences specication:
∆Misconducti = βCrisis Price Changez + γlog(Experience)i + δf + δlr + εi (2.1)
where i indicates a nancial advisor, z indicates a ZIP code, f indicates a nan-
cial advisory rm, and lr indicates the decile of the advisor's length of residency in
their current home. The dependent variable, ∆Misconducti, measures the change in
the number of misconduct events committed by advisor i over the three year post-
crisis period (20082010)19 compared to the three year pre-period, (20052007).20
19To avoid survival bias, we include advisors who exit the industry during this three year period.
The results are robust if we instead exclude these advisors from the sample.
20Internet Appendix Table 4 shows the results are robust to using alternative time periods. In
column (1), we follow Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang (2018), who dened the pre-period as
20052006 and the post-period as 20092010. In column (2), we follow Bernstein, McQuade, and
Townsend (2018), who dened the pre-period as 20052007 and the post-period as 20082012. In
column (3), we treat 2008 as a gap year and dene the post-period as 20092011.
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log(Experience)i is the natural logarithm of the number of years that the advisor has
worked in the industry.
In this specication, time-invariant eects are dierenced away at the advisor level.
Advisors in ZIP codes unaected by the housing price collapse provide a control
for any time-varying change in the level of misconduct (e.g., a general increase in
misconduct or the detection of misconduct around the nancial crisis). The rm-
level xed eects control for any rm-specic changes in misconduct (e.g., perhaps
rms in areas more severely aected by the crisis changed in response to the crisis).
The length-of-residency decile xed eects control for any eects related to how long
an advisor has lived in his house.
2.3.2 Cumulative House Price Changes
Our second identication strategy is a panel approach using cumulative housing re-
turns.21 As described earlier, we construct the Cumulative Return for each advisor-
year, using the change in the advisor's house price since purchase, and estimate the
following specication:
Misconducti,t = βCumulative Return i,t +γlog(Exp.)i,t +δi +δz +δf,t +δlr + εi,t (2.2)
where Misconducti,t is an indicator variable equal to one if the advisor reports a
validated customer complaint during the current year.22 Cumulative Return i,t is the
cumulative price change since purchase for advisor i, which varies across advisors in
the same ZIP code at a given point in time. In addition to log(Exp.)i, we rely on
advisor, ZIP code, rm-year, and length of residence decile xed eects to remove
potential sources of confounding variation.
First, the nancial advisor xed eect, δi, removes all time-invariant character-
istics of the advisor, including his overall propensity to commit misconduct, and
also reduces the eect of advisor characteristics that are largely xed throughout the
sample, such as education and religious background. This xed eect also removes
the time-invariant part of the advisor's business activities, such as customer charac-
teristics, the types of products sold, etc. The advisor xed eect also removes any
time-invariant real estate preferences.
Second, the ZIP code xed eect, δz, removes the time-invariant characteristics
of the area in which the advisor lives. This is important as Parsons, Sulaeman,
and Titman (2018) show there are large dierences in misconduct rates across cities.
This xed eect also removes stable demographic and economic characteristics of the
neighborhood.
Third, the rm-year xed eect, δf,t, removes the time-invariant characteristics
of the rm that employs the advisor, as well as time-varying rm characteristics
such as changes in the rm's product oerings or monitoring procedures. Removing
21In Internet Appendix 5, we employ panel regressions with annual housing price returns. The
results are similar, in that we nd a signicant negative relation between housing price returns and
misconduct.
22Robustness tests reported in Internet Appendix 6 show the results are robust to using an
indicator variable for misconduct occurring in the subsequent year or during a three-year window.
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rm eects is important as Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) show that certain rms
specialize in committing misconduct. The rm-year xed eects also subsume year-
eects, removing the common time-series variation in housing returns and misconduct
(e.g., it would remove any common time-series relation between asset prices and
complaint rates).
Fourth, the length-of-residency xed eects, δlr, remove variation across advisors
based on how long they have lived in their current residence. The length-of-residency
is potentially important for several reasons. The loan-to-value ratio typically de-
creases with length of residency, and dierences in leverage ratios may aect nancial
advisors' actions. Further, longer residency may be associated with deeper commu-
nity ties, increasing the reputational cost of engaging in misconduct.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Changes in Misconduct and House Price Shocks during the Finan-
cial Crisis
Table 2.3 reports results from dierences-in-dierences specications, in which there
is one observation per advisor. The dependent variable is the change in misconduct,
dened as the number of instances of misconduct during the three-year period23 2008
2010 less the number during 20052007. The key independent variables are based on
the advisor's housing price shock during the nancial crisis (the house return in
2008). In column (1), the independent variable is Crisis Price Change which is the
percentage price change of the advisor's house. In columns (2), (3), and (4) the
independent variables are indicators equal to one if the return on the advisor's house
was equal to or less than -5%, -10%, or -15%, respectively. All columns include a
control for the logarithm of years of industry experience. All specications include
rm xed eects to absorb any variation common to an advisory rm such as its
product oerings, internal monitoring procedures, etc., as well as length of residence
xed eects to absorb any variation related to how long an advisor has lived in his
house. The standard errors are clustered by ZIP code.
The results in all four columns show a signicant relation between house price
shocks and changes in misconduct; misconduct increases for advisors who suer the
largest house price declines during the nancial crisis. The economic magnitudes
implied by the results are large relative to the baseline frequency of misconduct. For
example, the coecient estimate in column (3) implies that an advisor whose house
price dropped by 10% or more increases misconduct by 24.6% relative to the baseline
frequency of misconduct.
23Figure 2.4 shows that misconduct rates are higher for a three-year period following a real estate
price shock. Accordingly, and following the existing literature on nancial advisor misconduct around
shocks (e.g., Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham, 2018; Charoenwong, Kwan, and Umar, 2018), we use
a three-year window for misconduct.
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2.4.2 Misconduct and Cumulative House Price Changes
Table 2.4 reports results from panel regressions in which the unit of observation is
advisor-year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the
advisor commits misconduct in the current year. The key independent variable is
Cumulative Return, which is the cumulative percentage return on the advisor's house
since purchase. In column (1), we do not include advisor xed eects, and instead
control for the advisor characteristics: age, gender, previous misconduct, and licensing
(Series 6, 7, 24, 65, and 66).24 In columns (2) and (3), we include advisor xed-eects.
All specications include controls for the logarithm of years of industry experience
and rm-year, length of residence, and ZIP xed eects. In column (3), we test
whether the eect of returns on misconduct is non-linear. In this specication, we
add an interaction term, Cumulative Return × IExtreme, where IExtreme indicates a
cumulative return worse than -20%. The standard errors are clustered by advisor and
ZIP code.
Column (1) of Table 2.4 reports the simplest of the three specications. We report
this specication, which does not include individual xed eects, because it is easier to
interpret and to show the results are not dependent upon the inclusion of these xed
eects. The negative coecient shows that advisors with worse cumulative returns
are signicantly more likely to commit misconduct. The inclusion of rm-year xed
eects means that the specication limits the comparison to advisors who work for
the same rm during the same year  even within this limited comparison group,
advisors with worse returns commit more misconduct. The specication also includes
ZIP and length of residency xed eects, meaning that the ndings for Cumulative
Return are relative to other advisors living in the same area and advisors with similar
lengths of residency.
The specication reported in column (2), which we use as our benchmark speci-
cation for the remainder of the paper, includes individual xed eects. In this spec-
ication, an advisor is eectively benchmarked against his own behavior throughout
the sample. The results show that, even relative to his average misconduct behavior
throughout the sample, an advisor is more likely to commit misconduct when his
Cumulative Return is low. The results imply that a one standard deviation decrease
in cumulative returns (35.8 percentage points change) results in an 7.5 basis point in-
crease in the likelihood of misconduct, which is a 12% increase relative to the baseline
misconduct rate.
The specication reported in column (3) includes an interaction term,
(Cumulative Return − (−20%)) × IExtreme, where IExtreme indicates a cumulative
return worse than -20%. We include this specication with a cuto of -20% for two
reasons. First, as Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) show, the probability of nancial
distress increases non-linearly with the size of the cumulative loss, with the probabil-
ity increasing sharply well below a cumulative return of 0% (i.e., for small losses down
payments provide some protection). Second, many homeowners likely have only an
imprecise estimate of their home's value based on their neighbors' home sales, local
24For brevity, we report the coecients on these control variables in Internet Appendix Table
IA2.7 instead of in Table 2.4.
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news stories, observing new construction, etc. But it is unlikely the homeowner knows
precisely when their return switches from slightly positive to slightly negative. By
using a large negative cumulative return, we focus on individuals who almost surely
know they have suered large losses. The results in column (3) show the relation
between cumulative housing returns and misconduct is non-linear. The increase in
misconduct is much greater for large negative returns, indicating that misconduct is
signicantly more sensitive to large losses on housing.
2.4.3 A Placebo Test
As a robustness test, we employ a bootstrap-placebo procedure. For each repetition
of this procedure, we randomly match each ZIP code with another ZIP code from
a dierent state. We then assign each advisor-year the cumulative housing return
from the matched ZIP code-year based on the advisor's year of purchase. The match
between ZIP codes is xed for all years within a single repetition of the bootstrap
procedure. For example, suppose that in 2006 an advisor named Bob lived in a
house in ZIP code 48823 that he purchased in 2000. Further suppose that, for this
repetition of the bootstrap, ZIP code 48823 was randomly assigned returns from ZIP
code 78722. Then, in 2006 Bob would be assigned the six-year cumulative housing
return from ZIP code 78722. If Bob continued living in the same house, then in
2007 he would be assigned the seven-year cumulative housing return from ZIP code
78722. Other advisors in ZIP code 48823 would also be assigned returns from ZIP
code 78722, but their cumulative housing returns would vary depending on their
year of purchase. Using these pseudo-cumulative housing returns, we estimate the
specication reported in column (2) of Table 2.4. We repeat this procedure 10,000
times.
This procedure assigns random cumulative returns for each advisor-year observa-
tion, but crucially, preserves all other time-series and cross-sectional relations in the
panel. The time-series relations are preserved because the advisor's pseudo cumula-
tive return is drawn from the same randomly assigned ZIP code for each year. The
cross-sectional relations between advisors in a single ZIP code are preserved because
their pseudo cumulative returns are all drawn from the same randomly assigned ZIP
code. Further, any eects caused purely by the length of residency are preserved.
For example, suppose that advisors with greater length of residency generally: (1)
have higher cumulative returns and (2) are less likely to increase misconduct follow-
ing house price shocks because of deeper community ties. This relation would be
preserved in the placebo test because the pseudo cumulative return is a function of
length of residency.
Figure 2.5 plots a histogram of the coecient estimates on the Pseudo-Cumulative
Return variable. The actual coecient estimate of -0.2082 lies over six standard
deviations below the mean of the bootstrapped coecients (-0.010), and none of the
10,000 placebo estimates are below the actual coecient estimate. Thus, the placebo
results suggest that it is the actual loss suered by the advisor that drives the relation
between housing returns and misconduct.
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2.5 Addressing Concerns about Commonality in Customer and Advisor
Shocks
As is most studies of fraud and misconduct, we observe detected misconduct not actual
misconduct. This creates the possibility of bias if variation in the detection rate is
correlated with the independent variable of interest. In our study, a possible concern
is that a customer's propensity to le a complaint against her advisor varies with the
customer's real estate returns. That is, if a customer is under nancial pressure due
to losses on her home, she may become more likely to le a complaint against her
advisor. In this section, we present a number of tests that address this concern.
2.5.1 ZIP-Year Fixed Eects
Column (1) of Table 2.5 is similar to the baseline specication, but includes ZIP-year
xed eects instead of ZIP xed eects. These xed eects exploit the fact that
cumulative housing returns vary across advisors in the same ZIP code during the
same year, based on when the advisors purchased their homes combined with the
price path of housing in that ZIP code. The ZIP-year xed eects remove variation
that is common to all advisors in the same ZIP code during the year, such as local
housing price shocks during the year, the economic and demographic characteristics of
the local customer base, and any other local commonalities including the propensity of
local customers to le complaints. In this specication, the variation in the dependent
variable is limited to the time-series increase in misconduct by an advisor relative to
the time-series increase of other advisors who live in the same ZIP code in that
year. The variation in the key independent variable is limited to the cross-sectional
variation across advisors living in the same ZIP code at that point in time.
This specication is quite conservative and likely removes much of the variation
of interest, but it eliminates potential confounding eects. For example, suppose that
dishonest advisors prefer to live in exciting metropolitan areas that have volatile real
estate prices. These advisors commit misconduct regardless of local housing returns.
Further suppose that customers are more likely to detect misconduct following a
market downturn because of price declines, greater vigilance, or other reasons. Such
a combination of events could create a spurious relation between housing returns and
misconduct, however, it would be removed by the inclusion of the ZIP-year xed
eects.
The results in column (1) show that the relation between misconduct and cu-
mulative housing returns remains negative and signicant. Even after including the
ZIP-year xed eects, we nd that advisors with worse cumulative returns are signif-
icantly more likely to commit misconduct. Further, the magnitude of the coecient
is similar to that in the baseline specication.
2.5.2 Branch-Year and Branch-ZIP-Year Fixed Eects
Column (2) of Table 2.5 includes branch-year xed eects, which subsume the rm-
year xed eects in the baseline specication. This specication removes any variation
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common to advisors who work at the same branch25 of the same rm during the year,
including local housing price shocks, the economic circumstances of the rm's local
customer base, local monitoring and oversight, and the rm's product oerings. Even
with these more stringent xed eects, the results show a signicant relation between
housing returns and misconduct.
Column (3) of Table 2.5 includes branch-year-ZIP xed eects, which subsume
both the rm-year and zip-year xed eects. This specication eectively limits the
comparison to be between advisors who work for the same branch of the same rm
and live in the same ZIP code during the year. These are very restrictive xed
eects that remove many sources of potentially confounding variation. The cost of
including these xed eects, however, is that we likely remove variation of interest
and that we must drop more than half the observations due to insucient variation
within the xed eect unit. The results show that, once again, there is a signicant
negative relation between Cumulative Return and misconduct. Advisors with worse
cumulative returns on their home are signicantly more likely to commit misconduct
even relative to their local co-workers.
2.5.3 Out-of-State Customers
The previous xed eect specications include ZIP-year and branch-ZIP-year xed
eects. These xed eects remove all variation common to advisors living in the
same ZIP code during the same year  such as shared variation in the advisors'
customer base. It is possible, however, that even after removing ZIP-year variation,
there remains a positive correlation between the real estate shocks of advisors and
their customers. For example, suppose that because of demographic similarity ad-
visors who recently purchased a house are disproportionately likely to match with
customers who also recently purchased a house, resulting in similar cumulative real
estate returns even within ZIP-year. In this section, we address the issue of advisor-
customer commonality by using an alternative dependent variable.
Although many customer-advisor matches are between geographically proximate
individuals, this is not always the case. In the data, we can observe the state of resi-
dence for customers who le complaints26 and nd that 15.4% of customer complaints
are out-of-state customer complaints.27 In the results reported in column (1) of Ta-
ble 2.6, we limit the dependent variable to include only customer complaints led
by out-of-state customers. In column (2), we further limit the dependent variable
to exclude complaints led by customers living in bordering states (e.g., for advisors
living in Florida we would exclude out-of-state complaints led by customers living
in Alabama and Georgia).
25Following Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018b), we classify same branch advisors as individuals
who are employed by the same rm and live in the same county. This denition diers from that of
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) who use business address information that is not provided
by all states.
26Unfortunately, we do not observe the state of residence for customers who do not le complaints.
27As multiple customers can le a complaint in a year, 27.3% of advisor-years with Misconduct
include at least one out-of-state complaint.
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In both columns, the results show that the relation between the advisor's Cumu-
lative Return and misconduct remains signicant even with this restricted dependent
variable. This test breaks the link between the local real estate price shock suf-
fered by the advisor and the shock suered by the (geographically distant) customer,
suggesting that it is not the customers' real estate losses that drive our results.
2.5.4 Regulatory Actions and Employment Separation After Allegations
In this section, we present another test to address the potential concern that, even
after the inclusion of the xed eects, an advisor's Cumulative Return is correlated
with his customer's housing returns, or more generally, correlated with time-variation
in his customer's propensity to le complaints. Specically, in column (3) of Table 2.6
the dependent variable is set equal to one if the advisor discloses a regulatory action
or an employment separation after allegations. For this test, we exclude all advisor-
year observations that include a customer complaint to ensure the regulatory actions
and employment separations are not responses to customer complaints (e.g., if a rm
terminated an advisor because of a customer complaint).28
Government regulation of nancial advisors is conducted by state governments.
We include state-year xed eects to remove the state regulator's overall propensity
to take actions in a given year.29 We also continue to include rm-year xed eects to
remove each rm's propensity to terminate its employees during a given year. These
xed eects remove the most obvious sources of confounding variation  as there is
no obvious reason to expect that a state regulator or rm would disproportionately
target advisors with worse cumulative housing returns.
The results in column (3) show that, even when misconduct is limited to exclude
customer complaints, advisors with worse Cumulative Return are signicantly more
likely to commit misconduct. Overall, the results in Table 2.6 support the argument
that wealth shocks aect the propensity of nancial advisors to commit misconduct.
2.6 Cross-Sectional Variation in Termination Risk
In this section, we test how cross-sectional variation in termination risk aects the
relation between real estate shocks and misconduct. Prior studies show that there
is large variation in the likelihood that an advisor is terminated after committing
misconduct (e.g., Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2018a,b). Higher termination risk implies
a lower expected return to committing misconduct. Thus, all else held equal, we
expect advisors with higher termination risk will be less likely to increase misconduct
following a real estate shock.
28We hand checked a subsample of regulatory actions and employment separations that occur
without customer complaints. Examples of the stated reasons include incorrect reporting of infor-
mation into company system, holding non-approved seminars, sale of non-approved products,
and use of non-approved marketing materials.
29FINRA is responsible for some regulation at the national level, but national level eects will
be subsumed by the state-year xed eects.
39
Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a) show large across-rm variation in tolerance for
misconduct. We measure each advisor's termination risk based on the fraction of
the other advisors working at the rm who have a history of prior misconduct. If
this fraction is above the sample average, we set the indicator variable High Firm-
Year equal to one.30 The results, reported in column (1) of Table 2.7, show that
the coecient on the interaction term Cumulative Return × High Firm-Y ear is
signicant and negative. Even after controlling for rm-year xed eects, the eect
of a real estate shock on misconduct is greater when the career risk associated with
committing misconduct is smaller.
The specication in column (2) of Table 2.7 is conceptually similar to that in
column (1), but here we consider tolerance for misconduct at a ner geographic
level. For this test, we create an indicator variable High Branch-Year, which is set
to one if an above average proportion of the advisor's fellow employees who work
at the same branch have a history of past misconduct. This variable allows for the
possibility that a rm's tolerance for misconduct in a given year could vary across
branches due to the local manager, state regulators, or other reasons. The coecient
on the interaction term is signicant and negative; advisors are more likely to commit
misconduct following a real estate shock when they work for a branch with a high
tolerance for misconduct.
Column (3) of Table 2.7 considers individual-level career risk from committing
misconduct, rather than rm or branch level career risk. Egan, Matvos, and Seru
(2018b) show that, relative to men, women are more likely to be terminated for mis-
conduct and less likely to nd new employment following termination. Accordingly,
women face relatively more severe career risk for committing misconduct. As in Egan,
Matvos, and Seru (2018b), 25% of advisors in our sample are female. The coecient
on the interaction term CumulativeReturn×Female is signicant and positive. In-
deed, for females the net eect of Cumulative Return is not signicant. Overall, the
results in this section show that the relation between real estate shocks and miscon-
duct is stronger when there is less career risk from committing misconduct.
2.7 Active versus Passive Misconduct
Throughout the paper, we have interpreted misconduct as an active choice. That is,
that advisors deliberately exploit their clients for nancial gain. If advisors derive
utility from ethical behavior,31 and ethical behavior is a normal good, then advisors'
30We do not include the advisor's own history of misconduct when constructing this variable
because of biases that occur in xed eect regressions in which an independent variable is a function
of lagged values of the dependent variable. See Nickell (1981) for further discussion. Because the
advisor's own history of misconduct is not included in this variable, its direct eect is not fully
subsumed by the rm-year xed eect, and so it is included in the regression. However, due to its
high correlation with the rm-year xed eects, the coecient on the direct eect is unreliable due
to multicollinearity. However, the issue of multicollinearity does not aect the coecient on the
interaction term, which is the coecient of interest.
31Deriving utility from ethical behavior implies an advisor may forgo at least some opportunities
to commit misconduct even when the misconduct has a positive nancial net present value. For
formal modeling of ethical preferences, see Block and Heineke (1975) and Morrison and Thanassoulis
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consumption of ethical behavior will decrease when wealth decreases. Alternatively,
as advisors approach the bankruptcy boundary the nancial penalties associated with
detected misconduct may no longer provide a deterrent (for further discussion see
Block and Lind, 1975).
In this section, we consider an alternative possibility  that real estate shocks
result in passive misconduct through inattention or negligence. Passive misconduct
could increase following real estate shocks if the advisor becomes distracted and less
eective at work due to nancial pressure (e.g., Maturana and Nickerson, 2018, show
that students' standardized test scores suer when their teacher undergoes nancial
distress). Note that active and passive misconduct are not mutually exclusive, and
both could occur even for the same individual.
We separate misconduct into active and passive categories by parsing the text
elds in the advisors' disclosure statements and classifying misconduct based on key
words. Active Misconduct includes misrepresentation, unauthorized trading, fee or
commission related misconduct, churning, and fraud. These are acts of commission
(intentional actions) that will enrich the advisor if undetected. Passive Misconduct
includes negligence and omission of key facts. These include acts of omission, and
are more consistent with carelessness or inattention instead of enrichment. There are
some categories of misconduct, such as unsuitability and violations of duciary duty,
that we do not classify. Of advisor-years with misconduct events, 53.6% are classied
as active, 17.0% as passive, and the remainder cannot be unambiguously classied.
In column (1) of Table 2.8 the dependent variable includes only Active Misconduct.
The coecient on Cumulative Return is signicant and negative. The result shows
that, following a decline in the value of their home, advisors are more likely to commit
active misconduct  taking deliberate actions to exploit customers for nancial gain.
The results in column (2) show there is also evidence of passive misconduct.
2.8 Robustness Tests
2.8.1 Alternative Types of Misconduct
In this subsection we present several robustness tests that are similar to the baseline
specication, but use alternative denitions of misconduct. In column (3) of Table 2.8
the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the advisor committed
misconduct involving mutual funds. Mutual funds are a relatively straightforward
nancial product, and are typically regulated and distributed at the national level. In
contrast, other nancial products may vary across states due to regulator dierences
(e.g., annuities and some insurance products) or may be distributed primarily in a
limited geographic area (e.g., local micro-cap stocks). Limiting the dependent variable
to include only mutual funds reduces the possibility that some type of assortative
matching of local products to local customers could confound our analysis. Consistent
with the baseline specication, column (3) nds a signicant negative coecient on
Cumulative Return.
(2017).
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In column (4) of Table 2.8 the dependent variable is set equal to one if there
is an incident of misconduct in which the damages exceed $100,000. A potential
concern with the results is that the advisors' actions are unrelated to their own real
estate returns but that customers become more likely to le complaints following
negative real estate shocks (given the xed eects, this concern would also require
within-ZIP-year commonality in real estate returns between advisors and customers).
This possibility is most plausible for borderline cases with relatively small dollar
damages, as it is unlikely that customers would tolerate severe misconduct regardless
of real estate wealth. The results show that, even with this restrictive denition of
misconduct, there is a signicant negative relation between the advisor's cumulative
real estate returns and large cases of misconduct.
In column (5) of Table 2.8, we dene misconduct following Egan, Matvos, and
Seru (2018a) who use a broader measure of misconduct that, in addition to customer
complaints, also includes regulatory actions, terminations by an employing rm, and
criminal and civil disclosures. The results are similar to those in the baseline speci-
cation. Overall, the results in Table 2.8 show that advisors who suer declines in the
value of their home are more likely to commit misconduct of all types.
2.8.2 Imputed Housing Returns and Advisor Financial Distress
Throughout the paper we use imputed house price returns to measure wealth shocks to
nancial advisors. As a validation test of this measure, we test whether imputed house
price returns predict actual nancial distress. FINRA requires nancial advisors
to disclose any bankruptcy ling or other compromise with creditors in which a
creditor agrees to accept less than the full amount owed32 for a 10 year period
(because advisors no longer need to disclose these events after 10 years, for these
tests the sample period begins in 2008). We use these disclosures to create two
measures of nancial distress.
In column (1) of Table 2.9, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one
if the advisor les for bankruptcy in the next year. Aside from this change to the
dependent variable, the specication is identical to the baseline specication. The
results show that advisors with worse cumulative housing returns are signicantly
more likely to declare bankruptcy. Further, the implied economic magnitudes of the
estimates are large relative to the baseline rate of bankruptcy; the coecient estimate
implies that a one standard deviation decline in Cumulative Return is associated with
an 0.11 percentage point increase in the probability of bankruptcy (a 36.4% increase
relative to the baseline rate of bankruptcy).
In column (2) of Table 2.9, the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if
the advisor discloses a compromise with creditors related to an underwater sale (a
house sale in which the proceeds are less than the debts secured by the property and
the advisor does not pay the lender the dierence) in the next year. This provides
a very direct measure of nancial distress related to housing returns. The results
show that advisors with worse cumulative house returns are signicantly more likely
32See www.finracompliance.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Finra-U4-U5-QnA.pdf for a
more detailed denition of the reporting requirements.
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to disclose underwater home sales. Further, the implied magnitudes are large; the
coecient estimate implies that a one standard deviation decline in Cumulative Re-
turn is associated with a 0.14 percentage point increase in underwater sales (a 130.4%
increase relative to the baseline rate). Overall, the results in Table 2.9 provide evi-
dence that our imputed measure of housing price returns captures meaningful wealth
shocks for nancial advisors.
2.9 Conclusion
We test whether household level nancial shocks aect the propensity of employees to
engage in nancial misconduct. We measure nancial shocks using nancial advisors'
housing price declines and measure misconduct using validated customer complaints
disclosed in mandatory regulatory lings. We nd that advisors who suer large
housing price declines become signicantly more likely to commit misconduct  and
that many of these misconduct events are willful actions such as churning and unau-
thorized trading. We also show that advisors' housing returns explain misconduct
targeting out-of-state customers, breaking the link between customer and advisor
housing shocks.
Our ndings show that the willingness to commit misconduct is a pliable charac-
teristic of the individual; advisors are more likely to commit misconduct when they
are under nancial pressure. The results provide useful information for rms design-
ing compliance and monitoring systems and for regulators allocating limited auditing
resources.
Our nding that misconduct increases following negative wealth shocks suggests
important welfare implications. Although our empirical tests dierence out aggregate
time-series eects, to the extent wealth eects in misconduct are generalizable to
aggregate wealth shocks, there are two implications. First, the willingness to commit
misconduct will rise in states of the world in which marginal utility is highest, making
the direct losses from misconduct particularly painful. Second, misconduct erodes
trust and causes people to exit markets (see Giannetti and Wang, 2016; Gurun,
Stoman, and Yonker, 2018) precisely when expected returns are the highest.
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Table 2.1: Advisors and Disclosures
This table summarizes misconduct disclosures that nancial advisors are required to make. The rst column reports the number
of advisors with the associated misconduct measure. The second and third columns report the percent of oending advisors
and advisor-years, respectively. Misconduct is dened using customer disputes as in Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018)
and is comprised of customer disputes that either receive an award in arbitration or are settled for at least a certain dollar value
($10,000 or $15,000 depending upon the time period). Out-of-State Misconduct is dened using customer disputes only from
out-of-state customers. Regulatory is a disclosure of nalized regulatory sanctions from entities such as the SEC, FINRA, or
state regulators. Employment Separation After Allegations reports whether the advisor has ever been terminated or permitted
to resign following allegations of misconduct. EMS Misconduct is dened using a broader set of disclosures as in Egan, Matvos,
and Seru (2018a) and includes Misconduct, Regulatory, and Employment Separation After Allegations, as well as certain civil
law and criminal disclosures. Bankruptcy is disclosures of bankruptcies by nancial advisors. Underwater Sale is disclosures
that pertain specically to an underwater sale of a property. Bankruptcy and Underwater Sale are only available for the years
2008 through 2017. Leave Firm is an indicator variable set to one when an advisor leaves the rm for any reason.
Advisors (#) Advisors (%) Advisor-Years (%)
Misconduct 14,691 4.66 0.63
Out-of-State Misconduct 4,016 1.28 0.16
Regulatory 2,535 0.80 0.10
Employment Separation After Allegations 3,420 1.09 0.12
EMS Misconduct 19,232 6.11 0.85
Bankruptcy 4,773 1.55 0.31
Underwater Sale 1,643 0.53 0.11
Leave Firm 204,679 64.98 13.97
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A reports statistics regarding advisor misconduct. Panel B reports statistics
regarding advisor residency and experience for the 2,860,572 advisor-year observations. Panel C summarizes the distribution of
house price changes.
Panel A: Advisor Misconduct 1% 25% Median Mean 75% 99%
Alleged Damages from Customer Disputes ($) 0 5,000 19,000 659,666 100,000 3,500,000
Settle Amount for Customer Disputes ($) 0 2,870 15,754 239,485 59,347 3,100,000
Regulatory Damages ($) 100 1,000 5,000 13,125 10,000 200,000
Panel B: Advisor-Year Variables 1% 25% Median Mean 75% 99%
Industry Experience (years) 1 5 10 11.8 17 37
Firm Tenure (years) 0 2 4 5.9 8 27
House Purchase Price ($) 65,800 153,100 229,700 320,539.0 376,300 1,502,300
Zillow ZIP Price ($) 73,800 176,000 268,900 373,678.6 445,700 1,714,400
Years at Residence 1 3 5 5.8 8 22
Number of Residences 1 1 1 1.7 2 5
Panel C: Distribution of House Price Changes 1% 5% 10% Median 90% 95% 99%
Annual Dollar Change -91,300.0 -42,600.0 -26,000.0 3,700.0 49,000.0 76,400.0 164,100.0
Annual Percent Change -18.1 -10.7 -7.6 1.7 13.7 17.8 26.7
Cumulative Dollar Change -212,200.0 -97,900.0 -54,000.0 23,500.0 198,900.0 303,800.0 618,800.0
Cumulative Percent Change -37.9 -20.9 -13.1 9.7 64.1 92.1 150.0
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Table 2.3: Housing Price Shocks and Misconduct  Crisis Dierences-in-Dierences
This table reports OLS estimates of dierences-in-dierences regressions around the
2008 nancial crisis. The dependent variable is the dierence in the number of advisor
misconduct incidences between the post-event period and the pre-event period. The
pre-event period is a three-year window from 2005 to 2007. The post-event period
is a three-year window from 2008 to 2010. The unit of observation is the advisor.
Crisis Price Change is the 2008 house price return in the advisor's ZIP code. Crisis
Price Drop (X%) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the percentage change in house
prices in the advisor's ZIP code decreases at least X%. log(Industry Experience) is
the logarithm of the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. All
specications include rm xed eects and length at residency decile xed eects.
Standard errors are clustered by ZIP code. The symbols *, **, and *** denote
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
∆ Misconduct
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis % Price Change -0.0509∗∗∗
(0.0121)
Crisis Price Drop (5%) 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0013)
Crisis Price Drop (10%) 0.0061∗∗∗
(0.0015)
Crisis Price Drop (15%) 0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0020)
log(Industry Experience) 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Observations 248,432 248,432 248,432 248,432
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Table 2.4: Cumulative House Price Return and Misconduct
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumula-
tive house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the advisor-year.
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for advisor misconduct (multiplied
by 100). Cumulative Return is the aggregated cumulative price change divided by
the purchase price. In column (3), the specication also includes an interaction term,
(Cumulative Return − (−20%)) × IExtreme, where IExtreme indicates a cumulative
return worse than -20%. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of the number of
years an advisor has worked in the industry. Specication (1) includes advisor control
variables and rm×year, ZIP code, and length at residency decile xed eects. The
latter specications replace the advisor controls with advisor xed eects. Standard
errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Misconduct
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Return -0.0847∗∗∗ -0.2082∗∗∗ -0.1951∗∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0303) (0.0310)
Cumulative Return×IExtreme -0.4664∗
(0.2777)
log(Industry Experience) 0.2382∗∗∗ 0.4914∗∗∗ 0.4916∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0219) (0.0219)
Advisor Controls Yes No No
Advisor FE No Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.032 0.146 0.146
Observations 2,882,302 2,860,572 2,860,572
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Table 2.5: Addressing Concerns about Commonality in Customer and Advisor Shocks
This table reports estimates from regressions of measures of misconduct on an ad-
visor's cumulative house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the
advisor-year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for advisor misconduct
in a year (multiplied by 100). Cumulative Return is the aggregated cumulative price
change divided by the purchase price. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of
the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. In all columns, the spec-
ications include advisor, rm×year, length at residency decile, and ZIP code xed
eects. In column (1), the specication also includes ZIP×year xed eects. In col-
umn (2), the specication also includes branch×year xed eects. In column (3), the
specication also includes branch×year×ZIP xed eects. Standard errors, clustered
by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and ***
denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Misconduct
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Return -0.1574∗∗∗ -0.1268∗∗∗ -0.1707∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0385) (0.0796)
log(Industry Experience) 0.5016∗∗∗ 0.5125∗∗∗ 0.4651∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0283) (0.0509)
Advisor FE Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Subsumed Subsumed
ZIP FE Subsumed Yes Subsumed
ZIP×Year FE Yes No Subsumed
Branch×Year FE No Yes Subsumed
Branch×Year×ZIP FE No No Yes
R2 0.188 0.241 0.491
Observations 2,833,467 2,312,551 1,076,138
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Table 2.6: Out-of-State Customers, Non-Customer Misconduct, and Advisor Shocks
This table reports estimates from regressions of measures of misconduct on an ad-
visor's cumulative house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the
advisor-year. In column (1), the dependent variable equals one if advisor misconduct
is reported by clients who live in a dierent state than the advisor. In column (2),
the dependent variable equals one if advisor misconduct is reported by clients who
live in a state that does not border the advisor's state. In column (3), the depen-
dent variable equals one if a regulator or rm reported incidences of misconduct. In
column (3), we exclude sample observations if a client also reports an incident of
misconduct in the same year. In each column, we multiply the dependent variable
by 100. Cumulative Return is the aggregated cumulative price change divided by the
purchase price. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of the number of years an
advisor has worked in the industry. In all columns, the specications include advisor,
rm×year, length at residency decile, and ZIP code xed eects. In column (3), the
specication also includes state×year xed eects. Standard errors, clustered by ad-
visor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Out-of-State Distant Regulator or
Customer Customer Firm Actions
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Return -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0351∗∗∗ -0.0441∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0126) (0.0181)
log(Industry Experience) 0.1064∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0134)
Advisor FE Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes
State×Year FE No No Yes
R2 0.140 0.140 0.179
Observations 2,860,572 2,860,604 2,842,344
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Table 2.7: Cross-Sectional Variation in Termination Risk
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumula-
tive house price return since purchase, interacted with indicator variables. The unit
of observation is the advisor-year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for
advisor misconduct (multiplied by 100). High Firm-Year is an indicator variable set
to one if the rm-year has an above average misconduct rate (excluding the advisor's
own misconduct). High Branch-Year is an indicator variable set to one if the branch-
year has an above average misconduct rate (excluding the advisor's own misconduct).
Branch is dened as a rm-county. Female is an indicator variable for gender. Prior
Misconduct is set to one if the advisor has ever had an incidence of misconduct in
the past. All specications include advisor, rm×year, length at residency decile,
and ZIP code xed eects. Standard errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Return -0.1641∗∗∗ -0.1347∗∗∗ -0.2839∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0310) (0.0355) (0.0187)
High Firm-Year 5.1985∗∗∗
(0.3923)
C. Return×High Firm-Year -0.0849∗
(0.0467)
High Branch-Year 0.0671∗∗∗
(0.0239)
C. Return×High Branch-Year -0.1559∗∗∗
(0.0447)
C. Return×Female 0.3020∗∗∗
(0.0423)
Prior Misconduct 2.2214∗∗∗
(0.0647)
C. Return×Prior Misconduct -0.3556∗∗∗
(0.1265)
log(Industry Experience) 0.4892∗∗∗ 0.4900∗∗∗ 0.4922∗∗∗ 0.2696∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0066)
Advisor FE Yes Yes Yes No
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.031
Observations 2,860,572 2,860,572 2,843,273 2,882,302
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Table 2.8: Alternative Measures of Misconduct
This table reports results from regressions with alternative measures of misconduct
as the dependent variables. Mutual Fund is an indicator variable if the advisor had
misconduct related to mutual funds. In column (2), the dependent variable is a
misconduct indicator in which the damages exceed $100,000. EMS is the misconduct
measure from Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018a). In each column, we multiply the
dependent variable by 100. The unit of observation is the advisor-year. log(Industry
Experience) is the logarithm of the number of years an advisor has worked in the
industry. All specications include advisor, rm×year, length at residency decile,
and ZIP code xed eects. Standard errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Mutual Fund ≥100k EMS
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Return -0.0767∗∗∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.2584∗∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0179) (0.0345)
log(Industry Experience) 0.4694∗∗∗ 0.1724∗∗∗ 0.5469∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0127) (0.0261)
Advisor FE Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.126 0.135 0.163
Observations 2,860,572 2,860,572 2,860,572
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Table 2.9: Predicting Real Outcomes
This table tests whether our cumulative return measure reliably predicts negative nancial outcomes for advisors. The unit
of observation is the advisor-year. In column (1), the dependent variable, Bankruptcy, is an indicator equal to one if the
advisor reports a bankruptcy or other compromise with creditors. In column (2), the dependent variable, Underwater Sale,
is an indicator equal to one if the advisor reports an underwater home sales (for which the advisor does not make the lender
whole). Termination is an indicator equal to one if the advisor was terminated or permitted to resign following allegations of
misconduct. Leave Firm is an indicator equal to one if the advisor left the rm for any reason. In all columns, the dependent
variable is multiplied by 100. For data availability reasons, columns (1) and (2) are only estimated starting in 2008. log(Industry
Experience) is the logarithm of the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. All specications include advisor,
rm×year, length at residency decile, and ZIP code xed eects. Standard errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Bankruptcy Underwater Sale Termination Leave Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Return -0.3120∗∗∗ -0.3962∗∗∗ -0.0247∗∗ -1.7784∗∗∗
(0.0703) (0.0536) (0.0114) (0.1205)
log(Industry Experience) -0.1137∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ -1.0217∗∗∗
(0.0515) (0.0300) (0.0100) (0.1099)
Advisor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.263 0.274 0.140 0.380
Observations 1,272,337 1,272,337 3,486,167 3,486,167
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Figure 2.1: Real Estate Price Shocks by Year
This gure plots the fraction of nancial advisors whose residence experiences a year-
over-year decline in price of at least 10% during the sample period, as measured by
the Zillow ZIP code level house price index. We plot this measure separately for the
entire U.S. (black) and select states.
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Figure 2.2: Crisis Price Changes in Metro Atlanta
This gure displays price declines by ZIP code in 2008 for the Atlanta, GA metropoli-
tan statistical area. ZIP codes are color coded by level of 2008 loss where darker
shades indicate more severe losses.
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Figure 2.3: Misconduct by Ventile of Annual House Price Changes
This gure plots the misconduct rate of advisors by ventile of annual housing price
changes, as measured by the Zillow ZIP code level house price index. The grey
shaded area around the plot is the 95% condence interval. The dashed line marks
the unconditional average of misconduct (0.63%). Misconduct is measured as in
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) and includes customer disputes that are either
settled for a non-trivial amount or awarded in favor of the customer.
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Figure 2.4: Misconduct Timing around Real Estate Shocks
This gure plots the average misconduct rate in event time, where the event is a 10%
or worse decline in an advisor's house price, as measured by the Zillow ZIP code level
house price index. The gure plots three years before and three years after the event.
The grey shaded area around the plot is the 95% condence interval. The dashed line
marks the unconditional average of misconduct (0.63%). Misconduct is measured as
in Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2018) and includes customer disputes that are
either settled for a non-trivial amount or awarded in favor of the customer.
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Figure 2.5: Coecient of Pseudo Cumulative Return in Placebo Samples
The gure shows a histogram of Pseudo Cumulative Return coecients from 10,000
iterations of the model in Table 2.4, column (2). For each iteration, each ZIP code is
randomly assigned the returns of another out-of-state ZIP code (creating new counter-
factual values for Pseudo Cumulative Return). The model is re-estimated using the
counterfactual Pseudo Cumulative Return values. All other advisor characteristics
remain the same.
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Appendix A: Example Observation for Chapter 1
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Table IA1.1: Details on Estimates for All Control Variables
This table presents all results from estimating Equation (1.1) and its variants. See
Table 1.3. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is measured as the average
number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product in the subsequent year. Columns
(3) and (4) use reputation as measured by the Helpful reviews. Any Vesting Event
is an indicator variable set to 1 in any year in which the rm's CEO has either a
stock vesting event or an option vesting event. Any Stock Vesting and Any Option
Vesting decompose Any Vesting Event accordingly. See the data section for detailed
variable denitions. Control variables are included in the specications and dened
in the text. Indicators for xed eects are reported at the bottom of the table, and
standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in parentheses. Asterisks
represent the conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1 Helpful Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Vesting Event -0.067∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
Stock Vesting -0.101∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Option Vesting 0.022 -0.008
(0.029) (0.031)
Book-to-Market 0.061 0.062 -0.011 -0.011
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
Operating Margin 0.061 0.067 0.115 0.119
(0.106) (0.106) (0.115) (0.115)
Leverage -0.150 -0.137 -0.163 -0.154
(0.117) (0.117) (0.123) (0.123)
LN(Market Cap) -0.069∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
12-month Return 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.004
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R&D 0.798∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.313) (0.380) (0.384)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.063 0.066 0.067
Observations 52,924 52,924 50,168 50,168
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Table IA1.2: Vesting Events for Any Executive
This table presents the results from estimating Equation (1.1). The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is measured as
the average number of stars (out of 5) assigned to the product in the subsequent year. The second and third sets of specications
use two-year ahead product market reputation and the reputation as measured by the Helpful reviews, respectively. Any Vesting
Event is an indicator variable set to 1 in any year in which any of the rm executives have either a stock vesting event or an
option vesting event. Any Stock Vesting and Any Option Vesting decompose Any Vesting Event accordingly. See the data
section for detailed variable denitions. Control variables are included in the specications and dened in the text. Indicators
for xed eects are reported at the bottom of the table, and standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in
parentheses. Asterisks represent the conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Reputationt+1 Reputationt+2 Helpful Reputationt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Vesting Event (All Execs) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Any Stock Vesting (All Execs) -0.058∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Any Option Vesting (All Execs) 0.008 0.044 -0.026
(0.025) (0.030) (0.025)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.066
Observations 52,924 52,924 40,646 40,646 50,168 50,168
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Table IA2.1: Home Ownership
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumu-
lative house price change since purchase for subsamples of our dataset. The unit of
observation is the advisor-year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for
advisor misconduct in the current year (multiplied by 100). Cumulative Return is the
aggregated cumulative price change divided by the purchase price. In column (1),
we exclude ZIP codes with low levels of home ownership (<50%) as reported in the
American Community Survey. In column (2), we exclude multi-dwelling unit (MDU)
addresses (e.g., apartment buildings). log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of
the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. All specications include
advisor, rm×year, length at residency decile, and ZIP code xed eects. Standard
errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Misconduct
(1) (2)
Cumulative Return -0.2054*** -0.2076***
(0.0364) (0.0332)
log(Industry Experience) 0.5174*** 0.5007***
(0.0249) (0.0240)
Advisor FE Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes
Exclude Low Ownership ZIPs Yes No
Exclude MDUs No Yes
R-squared 0.151 0.151
Observations 2,342,187 2,522,052
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Table IA2.2: Federal Housing Price Index
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumula-
tive house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the advisor-year.
Column (1) reports OLS estimates of dierences-in-dierences regressions around the
2008 nancial crisis. The dependent variable is the dierence in the number of advisor
misconduct incidences between the post-event period and the pre-event period. The
pre-event period is a three-year window from 2005 to 2007. The post-event period
is a three-year window from 2008 to 2010. The dependent variable for columns (2)
and (3) is an indicator variable for advisor misconduct (multiplied by 100). Crisis
Price Change is the 2008 house price return in the advisor's ZIP code. Cumulative
Return is the aggregated cumulative price change divided by the purchase price. Both
measures of house price returns use the House Price Index produced by the Federal
Housing Finance Agency instead of Zillow estimates. log(Industry Experience) is the
logarithm of the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. The presence
of control variables and xed eects is indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard
errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis Price Change -0.0491***
(0.0106)
Cumulative Return -0.0427*** -0.0706***
(0.0118) (0.0210)
log(Industry Experience) 0.0046*** 0.2473*** 0.4952***
(0.0011) (0.0067) (0.0181)
Advisor Controls No Yes No
Advisor FE Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Subsumed Subsumed
Firm×Year FE No Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE No Yes Yes
R2 0.025 0.029 0.131
Observations 252,183 3,737,534 3,716,283
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Table IA2.3: Addressing Multiple Residences
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumula-
tive house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the advisor-year.
In columns (1) and (2), we calculate the cumulative return using only the highest
value residence when an advisor owns more than one property in a year. In columns
(3) and (4), we exclude all advisor-year observations in which the advisor reports
multiple residences. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for advisor mis-
conduct (multiplied by 100). Cumulative Return is the aggregated cumulative price
change divided by the purchase price. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of
the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. The presence of control
variables and xed eects is indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors,
clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **,
and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Misconduct
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Return -0.0779*** -0.1816*** -0.0652** -0.2038***
(0.0219) (0.0304) (0.0289) (0.0428)
log(Industry Experience) 0.2416*** 0.5061*** 0.2474*** 0.5798***
(0.0080) (0.0228) (0.0103) (0.0312)
Advisor Controls Yes No Yes No
Advisor FE No Yes No Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Highest Value Residence Yes Yes No No
Omit Multiple Residences No No Yes Yes
R2 0.033 0.149 0.038 0.169
Observations 2,730,735 2,709,002 1,689,573 1,667,363
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Table IA2.4: Alternate Dierences in Dierences Specications
This table reports OLS estimates of dierences-in-dierences regressions around the
nancial crisis. The dependent variable is the dierence in the number of advisor
misconduct incidences between the post-event period and the pre-event period. In
column (1), we follow Pool, Stoman, Yonker, and Zhang (2018), who dene the
pre-period as 20052006 and the post-period as 20092010. In column (2), we follow
Bernstein, McQuade, and Townsend (2018), who dene the pre-period as 20052007
and the post-period as 20082012. Column (3) is similar to our main specication
in Table 3, except that we introduce a gap year: the pre-event period is a three-year
window from 2005 to 2007, and the post-event period is a three-year window from 2009
to 2011. The unit of observation is the advisor. Crisis Price Change is the 2008 house
price return in the advisor's ZIP code. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of
the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. All specications include
rm xed eects and length at residency decile xed eects. Standard errors are
clustered by ZIP code. The symbols *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆Misconduct
PSYZ BMT Gap Year
(1) (2) (3)
Crisis Price Change -0.0289*** -0.0678*** -0.0366***
(0.0103) (0.0147) (0.0120)
log(Industry Experience) 0.0022** 0.0119*** 0.0035***
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.022 0.030 0.027
Observations 248,432 247,514 248,432
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Table IA2.5: Annual Returns
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's annual
house price return. The unit of observation is the advisor-year. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for advisor misconduct (multiplied by 100). Annual
Return is the annual price change divided by the house price at the beginning of the
year. log(Industry Experience) is the logarithm of the number of years an advisor has
worked in the industry. The presence of control variables and xed eects is indicated
at the bottom of the table. Standard errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are
reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Misconduct
(1) (2)
Annual Return -0.1937** -0.2364***
(0.0775) (0.0804)
log(Industry Experience) 0.2369*** 0.4809***
(0.0067) (0.0183)
Advisor Controls Yes No
Advisor FE No Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes
R2 0.029 0.132
Observations 3,910,975 3,890,805
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Table IA2.6: One-Year Ahead & Three-Year Misconduct
This table reports estimates from regressions of misconduct on an advisor's cumula-
tive house price return since purchase. The unit of observation is the advisor-year.
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is an indicator variable for advisor
misconduct (multiplied by 100) in the subsequent year. In columns (3) and (4), the
dependent variable is an indicator variable for advisor misconduct (multiplied by 100)
in the three year window from t=0 to t=2. Cumulative Return is the aggregated cu-
mulative price change divided by the purchase price. log(Industry Experience) is the
logarithm of the number of years an advisor has worked in the industry. The presence
of control variables and xed eects is indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard
errors, clustered by advisor and ZIP code, are reported in parentheses. The symbols
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Misconduct1 Misconduct02
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative Return -0.0516** -0.1451*** -0.1454*** -0.3605***
(0.0207) (0.0306) (0.0508) (0.0691)
log(Industry Experience) 0.2006*** 0.4569*** 0.5668*** 1.2585***
(0.0082) (0.0224) (0.0209) (0.0519)
Advisor Controls Yes No Yes No
Advisor FE No Yes No Yes
Length at Residency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ZIP FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.031 0.149 0.054 0.326
Observations 2,882,302 2,860,572 2,882,302 2,860,572
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Table IA2.7: Estimates for All Control Variables
This table reports the full control variable estimates from the regression of misconduct
on an advisor's cumulative house price return since purchase from Column (1) of
Table 2.4. See Table 2.4 for details.
Dependent Variable: Misconduct
Cumulative Return -0.0847∗∗∗
(0.0205)
log(Industry Experience) 0.2382∗∗∗
(0.0079)
Female -0.3237∗∗∗
(0.0106)
Age -0.0014∗∗
(0.0007)
Series 6 0.0141
(0.0157)
Series 7 0.0956∗∗∗
(0.0168)
Series 24 -0.0891∗∗∗
(0.0168)
Series 65 0.2749∗∗∗
(0.0163)
Series 66 0.1010∗∗∗
(0.0147)
Firm×Year, ZIP, Missing Demographic & Length at Residency FE Yes
R2 0.032
Observations 2,882,302
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